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New Republic

WHY LOUIS JOHNSON WAS FIRED

By ROBERT S. ALLEN & WILLIAM V. SHANNON

HISS'S GENERATION ON TRIAL

Review by MERLE MILLER

PEACE AIMS FOR KOREA

AN EDITORIAL

SHOULD WE REARM GERMANY?

By CAPTAIN B. H. LIDDELL HART

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HOW WAS THE LOAN TO FRANCO RAILROADED THROUGH A RELUCTANT CONGRESS?

Why did not a single Democratic leader in either the Senate or the House take the floor in opposition to the loan to Franco Spain? How was this obvious "bribe" to one of the world's most vicious dictators railroaded through Congress despite the vehement opposition of our President and the State Department?

(For answer, see page 7, September 4th issue of *New Republic*)

If you are a regular reader of the New Republic, you know the answers to these and other critical questions which vitally affect your welfare and your way of life. If not, you'll want to use the coupon below to make certain you don't miss a single issue!

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Congress has finally passed an expanded social-security program. Included in the bill was one small but destructive amendment which is a very real threat to the hard-won rights of labor. How did this amendment worm its way into law after Pres. Truman had clearly expressed his disapproval? And how will it affect your future security?

(For answer, see page 7, August 28th issue of *New Republic*)

WHY HAS THE 81st CONGRESS COMPILED SUCH A DISAPPOINTING RECORD?

Liberal hopes soared when Truman was unexpectedly elected in 1948. There was talk of civil-rights legislation, curbs on inflation, a better break for labor. Instead, the 81st Congress has done little more than the reactionary 80th. Why did it turn out that way? And what—if anything—can the individual voter do about it?

(For answer, see page 3, September 11th issue of *New Republic*)

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New Republic

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WASHINGTON WIRE

HERE'S WHAT the UN counter-attack in Korea may accomplish if the brilliant maneuver is successful: make Russia show her hand on how far she will go to save the North Koreans; precipitate a decision by the UN whether to abide by the old artificial Korean boundary along the 38th Parallel; spare the interior of South Korea from the deadly battle that would create native animosity against both sides; ultimately force a showdown in the US over Formosa. In addition to the above, a more favorable picture in the Korean war will help Democrats in their election contests.

Were the anti-Administration publishers sincere in their tears at allowing a military man to take the civilian post of defense chief? It's hard to believe so. What they and everybody else knew was that General Marshall's addition to the Truman Cabinet would strengthen it vastly. That was hard to take. Republicans in the House voted 100 to 27 against the Marshall admission bill: 20 to 10 against it in the Senate. The vituperative attack on Marshall by Senator Jenner (R, Ind.) turned even the stomachs of Taft Republicans who were working against Marshall by another route. As Jenner pounded his desk and shrieked that Marshall's life is "a living lie," he seemed from the gallery to be out of his head. In Baltimore, simultaneously, Joe McCarthy was calling Marshall "pliable" and declaring his "hatred of Chiang Kai-shek, unfortunately, is greater than his hatred for Communism."

Marshall's return changes many things. The new Acheson-Marshall team is likely to be the strongest in Washington. Marshall will not be immune to attacks of the Jenner-McCarthy type, but it will be hard for the public to accept these: the Washington Monument still stands in dignity though dogs use its base as a convenience. Marshall's prestige will help Truman and Acheson to combat the cardinal folly of the drift toward preventive war—a fallacy whose essence is sacrificing Europe as "expendable." Marshall will support Acheson (1) in placing emphasis on Europe, not Asia; (2) in refusing to see Red China as indissolubly wed to Moscow; (3) in putting greater weight on considerations of global diplomacy rather than short-range military strategy in approaching the Formosa issue. One final point: Marshall will be 70 in December. It is assumed that he will act as policy-maker and coördinator and that details will be handled by his executive assistant. The latter thus becomes of critical importance in the new team.

The GOP won the Maine election; why then does Truman profess satisfaction? Because in this barometer GOP state the percentage as well as the absolute number of Democratic voters went up compared to other recent mid-term contests. As Louis H. Bean, author of the current *The Mid-Term Battle* (see page 28), explains, this sample is important. The long-term Democratic trend is up; it was interrupted in 1946, but has risen since. If the Democrats can get out the vote throughout the country as they did in Maine they need not lose the 25 to 30 House seats which majority parties traditionally drop in a mid-term contest.

Do you enjoy seeing millionaires grovel? That's what they are doing before the reckless and groundless charges of "subversion" against their employees made by patrioteer outfits. Directors of universities, millionaire sponsors of television shows, fatback publishers and church trustees in Lincoln cars blanch at the first whisper of "radicalism" against their workers. Every actor, professor, reporter, minister of the gospel or other similar figure knows that in America today he is under greater pressure to conform than at any other time since A. Mitchell Palmer. Some of this patrioteering is done for profit and approaches blackmail. It is less despicable than the cringing attitude of the Big Money boys, who know what it is about but will throw the employee to the wolves rather than face attack.

These supposed "conservative" de-

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fenders of America reject the American heritage while their sons fight for it abroad. In the Jean Muir radio case the New York *Herald Tribune* and *Times* fought back splendidly. This is conservatism that means something, and thank God for it. But the poison is abroad. Interior Secretary Chapman is denounced by Senator Schoeppel (R, Kan.) on charges that even fellow Republicans disavow. Cringing Hollywood producers drop the filming of "Hiawatha" because it might be considered subversive! Only seven members of the US Senate vote against the McCarran catch-all anti-subversion bill. Little Harry Truman may be no great shakes as a Brain, but, if we mistake not, he has the guts to veto this bill, and if he does, hurrah for him, we say.

Failure to pass an excess-profits tax would mean that Congress is ready to draft lives, not dollars. Are US corporate profits really up? Yep. A National City Bank summary showing first half-year net income for 1950 compared with 1949 in manufacturing, mining, trade and service industries reveals a jump of 27 percent. This leap forward began before Korea. Since Korea, profits have jumped again. The $4.5 billion tax bill tentatively approved by Congress (without excess-profits taxes) gets two-thirds of its proposed revenue from individuals. The taxes on corporate profits should be two or three times heavier than those proposed.

Notes. Since 1940, inflation has cut the dollar's value almost in half; this means that a man without a dollar today is 50 cents better off than he was in 1940. . . . NLRB counsel Denham's resignation should help the Labor Board to end chaotic conditions; Truman kept his hands off as long as he could. . . . Sumner H. Slichter, professor of Economics at Harvard, has recently revived the late economist Irving Fisher's idea of government bonds redeemable in terms of fixed purchasing power regardless of inflation. . . . Federal lobbying-act reports for the first quarter of 1950 show 257 organizations spending $2,849,084 to influence legislation. . . . John Foster Dulles is running the new Japanese treaty drive; he wants quick agreement on generous terms with a rearmed Japan.

Washington T. R. B.

CORRESPONDENCE

Exceptions to Equality

SIR: It was 95 years ago that Abraham Lincoln wrote to his friend Joshua F. Speed:

> I am not a Know-Nothing; that is certain. How could I be? How can anyone who abhors the oppression of negroes be in favor of degrading classes of white people? Our progress in degeneracy appears to me to be pretty rapid. As a nation, we began declaring that *"all men are created equal."* We now practically read it, "all men are created equal, except negroes." When the Know-Nothings get control, it will read, "all men are created equal, except negroes and foreigners and Catholics." When it comes to this, I shall prefer emigrating to some country where they make no pretense of loving liberty—to Russia, for instance, where despotism can be taken pure, and without the base alloy of hypocracy. [sic].

Carson City, Nev. JOHN CULMAN

The Strike in Morristown

Two correspondents have written in to express violent disagreement with the article "Trouble in Tennessee" (issue of July 10) which discussed the strike of the CIO Textile Workers Union of America at the rayon plant of the American Enka Corporation at Morristown, Tennessee. Amos Brownlow of Knoxville says that our article "carefully avoided . . . the crucial point of the controversy between the AFL and the CIO," namely, "that at an election under the supervision of the National Labor Relations Board in December last year, the CIO was defeated about four to one."

Joseph Jacobs, Southern director for the United Textile Workers of America, AFL, sends us a letter much too long to be printed, which, as might be expected in view of the bitterness between the AFL and CIO unions, sharply attacks our article and the CIO Textile Workers Union of America. Mr. Jacobs denies that the AFL union is "small and docile," as our article suggested. He says it is in the "first 30 of the 108 international unions in the AFL" and gives a list of its activities which he says prove it is aggressive. "[It] won a two-year fight to defeat and disestablish the company union at the Enka plant in 1939. . . . Won bargaining rights in an NLRB election by a tremendous majority at the Asheville plant and then had to win a 13-day strike to get the first agreement in 1941. . . . Recently got a wage increase totaling 11 cents an hour for its members, the first wage increase in the rayon industry by any union in over a year."

Mr. Jacobs complains that the CIO "raided our union in Asheville during the fall and winter of 1949 . . . as they have tried during the past ten years to steal this local every time the agreement came up for renewal. . . . The record shows the TWUA-CIO has raided the UTWA-AFL in dozens of plants." In regard to Morristown, Mr. Jacobs denies that the Enka management favored the AFL union, saying the contrary is true. He also denies that Enka bought radio time to praise the AFL group, insisting that "the company ads in newspapers, and their statements on the air have sought to prevent *any* union from securing bargaining rights." Mr. Jacobs says his union "has repeatedly offered to reach a no-raid pact with the TWUA-CIO, but . . . its peace offers have not been accepted."

Kenneth Fiester, a spokesman for the TWUA-CIO, to whom we showed the correspondence, says that Mr. Brownlow "is confused. The election to which he refers did not involve the Enka plant at Lowlands (Morristown) but a larger unit at Asheville, N. C. The AFL textile union did indeed take part in the Lowlands election, but received only about one-sixth of the votes cast. As for the relative size of the unions, the AFL claims some 80,000; the CIO, 400,000."

In regard to the charges made by Mr. Jacobs, Mr. Fiester denies them all. He says that "like many other small, impoverished unions, the UTWA-AFL can maintain itself only by the sufferance of the employers with whom it has contracts. It is simply unable to maintain more than one strike at a time, at most; and thus can be militant only on an exceedingly selective basis. . . . Indeed, the UTWA 'victory' left its workers below the level of those in TWUA-CIO mills.

"The Asheville settlement [with the AFL union] was not in any sense a 'pattern' for the industry [as Mr. Jacobs suggested]. In the first place, it could not be, because the tail does not wag the dog. But second, and more important, the agreement subsequently negotiated by the TWUA-CIO with the American Viscose Corporation, the largest manufacturer of synthetic yarn, . . . set the real pattern."

A few weeks after our article appeared, the strike in Morristown was broken. Says Murray Kempton in the New York *Post*: "The 250 [strikers] who held out to the last will not go back to work; the company has replaced them. Some 50 face criminal charges growing out of last summer's violence. They have to stay through September to face trial; the rest are leaving the eastern Tennessee mountains they grew up in. . . .

"The Senate Labor Committee is due to issue a report on the American Enka strike in the near future. It is, of course, just an autopsy on the death of a union, and no one cares enough about that particular murder to take it very seriously." — THE EDITORS

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VOLUME 123, NUMBER 13, ISSUE 1869, NEW YORK CITY, SEPTEMBER 25, 1950 **New Republic**

PEACE AIMS FOR KOREA

WHAT ARE WE fighting for in Korea?

As long as we were retreating, our war aim was to halt the retreat. Russia's aim was to stall for time, hoping to defeat us with the Koreans she had armed to fight her battles.

Now the United Nations forces are advancing. The Koreans cannot hold out for long. If the Chinese refuse to replace them as Soviet cannon fodder, Russia faces three choices: to negotiate a settlement; to watch MacArthur advance to the Siberian border; or to reoccupy North Korea at the risk of a third world war.

Russia and China do not want a world war now. The United States certainly does not want a world war in which China and Russia are fighting side by side. Our whole policy in Asia since the collapse of the Kuomintang has been to disengage China from Russia. We have done well so far, and if we succeed, countless lives may be saved.

Yet the risk of world war is great. China may fight rather than endure a hostile power on the borders of Manchuria. Russia may fight rather than see Western guns within shelling distance of the naval base of Vladivostok.

The risk is obvious—and unavoidable. We have not wished to increase it by declaring that we will fight our way to Manchuria through any armies that stand in our path. We have not wished to invite the Chinese and Russian armies into Korea by announcing that the threat of world war will suffice to stop us short at the 38th Parallel. Our policy has been to have no policy; to have to leave every line open; to let Russia make the first move.

That policy has been sound. And so far, the 52 nations that backed the UN have had no opportunity to develop their peace aims.

Now the opportunity is present, as the Assembly meets. And the chance of keeping China and Russia out of the Korean war may turn on the kind of Korea that the UN decides it is fighting for.

What are the Koreans fighting for?

The Republic of Korea holds a third of the UN lines. Its casualties are heavy. Its claims are strong. The peace aims of its government are clear. It insists on its right to govern all Korea after the unconditional surrender of the North Korean forces has been secured.

In contrast, we and our allies are fighting, not for a peninsula but for a principle: the principle that when the North Koreans committed aggression against South Korea they attacked the UN and all of its loyal members.

The aims of the UN are not those of the Republic of Korea.

What is the UN fighting for? The US has the right to lead in formulating the peace aims of the UN in Korea. We suggest that these basic aims should guide our delegation in the weeks ahead:

Unity. The United Nations, by the assembly resolution of November, 1947, and all succeeding resolutions and reports, has committed itself irrevocably to the unification of Korea. The UN commission in Korea reported in 1949:

> The people of Korea are remarkably homogeneous. Ethnically and culturally they are one. They have a passionate longing for unity and independence and profound desire for the peaceful unification of their country. . . . The division of Korea has caused bitterness, frustration and mutual distrust. . . . There is no justification for the continued separation of the two parts of the country.

The resolution of the Security Council under which General MacArthur fights as UN commander directs the UN to "repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area." Further authorization may be necessary for an advance across North Korea. Yet Trygve Lie has affirmed the UN policy:

> It will not be enough to win from North Koreans obedience to the Security Council cease-fire order and their withdrawal to the 38th Parallel. The aim of the United Nations is and must be a united and independent Korea in which all the people of Korea are able freely to elect a government of their own choosing.

The unity of Korea is not the one fixed objective of Allied policy for which all other objectives must be sacrificed. But the authority of the UN is identified with the unification of Korea and for that reason alone the restoration of the *status quo ante* is no longer a matter for negotiation with the USSR.

Democracy. Lie's insistence that the Koreans must be able "freely to elect a government of their own choosing" should be our second peace aim, and is our basic

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disagreement with the government of the Republic of Korea.

Twenty million of Korea's 30 million citizens have lived under the Republic. Its President, Syngman Rhee, was not elected by popular vote, but chosen by the First National Assembly, elected in 1948. The 1948 elections were not under UN observation or direction and, according to the UN commission, were "boycotted by middle-of-the-road parties for fear that elections in only half of Korea would make permanent the artificial barrier at the 38th Parallel."

In the elections of May, 1950, all parties except the Communists participated. The UN commission reports that:

> The two largest parties in the previous assembly, the pro-government and the opposition [right wing – ED.], both suffered heavy losses. The most significant gains were made by those moderate elements which had boycotted the 1948 elections.

The government of the Republic has insisted that it is the one and only government of all Korea. The President's term runs through 1952, the Assembly's through 1954. Meanwhile the Assembly has held open 100 seats for representatives from North Korea, to be elected under its supervision.

The United Nations, in contrast, has not recognized the government of the Republic as the government of all Korea. It has said simply that there is no other government in Korea with valid claims. Even if the present South Korean Assembly, in which Rhee holds a bare majority, is recognized as a national assembly, Rhee and his administration will lack a valid claim to govern an enlarged Assembly and a wholly new area in North Korea. In asserting this vital point, it is not necessary to review the reasons why Rhee has lost the confidence of the Korean people. It is sufficient to stand on traditional democratic principle and to insist that North Koreans, who are one-third of the nation, have the right to be governed by a President and an administration chosen by an Assembly which they have helped to elect. This argument is constitutionally mandatory and politically sound. (The Communist leaders certainly will be barred as war criminals from holding public office, and the Communist Party kept off the ballot for its defiance of the UN.)

Rhee may seek reëlection as President of all Korea. If he is chosen, he will deserve support. But before elections are held, at least in North Korea, the problem of an interim government arises. It must be the UN, both because the UN has accepted responsibility for the war, and because the US has renounced all imperialist aims in Asia.

Independence. The whole history of Korea is bound up in the efforts of its people to resist foreign domination. To make Korea a US protectorate or a UN trust territory would be to embitter its people and to create an unnecessary and dangerous source of world tension.

Russia and China have a vital *strategic* interest in preventing foreign military forces from occupying Korea. We have no vital *strategic* interest in maintaining our military forces there.

The vital interest of the UN in Korea is a *political* interest, in Korea's *political* independence.

In today's divided world, political alliances must lead to military alliances. Independence means good relations with both sides. That is why Trygve Lie states that "it will be necessary for Korea to have good and peaceful relations with China and the Soviet Union as well as with Japan and the rest of the powers of the Pacific area."

Few small nations today can maintain independence without support. For Korea, support means direct action by the UN, first, in disarming the North Koreans and their allies; second, in supervising the creation of a Korean security force large enough to maintain internal order; then in withdrawing its own troops under a guarantee of the territorial integrity and independence of Korea.

Relief and reconstruction. Ahead of the UN lines lies a ruined country: its paddy fields trampled; its livestock slaughtered; its villages gutted; its roads and railways wrecked; its cities, mills and factories turned to rubble. In the tiny perimeter around Pusan, two million refugees are huddled without homes.

The ECA is distributing relief supplies in South Korea under a $90 million appropriation for this year. Brigadier Parmenter, acting as UN coördinator of relief, is directing the aid contributed at Lie's request by UN members. Yet these efforts are wholly inadequate as our lines advance and winter approaches. Immediate action is needed by the UN Assembly to organize a large-scale relief and reconstruction program.

To bring Korea back to prewar levels of production will take several years, and very large expenditures. To make Korea self-sustaining is a much larger task. Who will carry it out? ECA has done a wonderful job in Korea. But since our policy is to strengthen the UN, and to avoid suspicion of imperialism, it seems best that relief and reconstruction, like the war effort, should be the responsibility of the UN. We have a further interest in sharing the burdens of reconstruction. The USSR certainly should send large supplies of grain and other produce as moral reparations. Action programs in Korea can be carried out by the specialized agencies in the UN.

Who will provide central direction in formulating policy and distributing relief and reconstruction supplies? The job is far too large to be handled on the *ad hoc* basis established for the Arab refugees on the borders of Israel. The UN Assembly should establish at once a new relief and reconstruction agency for Korea.

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The Assembly should further initiate a program for training Koreans in civil administration.

Reform. Clyde Mitchell, one-time head of the National Land Administration in Korea and now chairman of the Department of Agricultural Economics at the University of Nebraska, said recently:

I state flatly that if social reform does not become the major goal of the United Nations after we have retaken Korea, the American boys dying in Korea will have died completely in vain.

Social reform in Korea means, above all, land reform.

The majority of Koreans are tenant farmers. For most of their lives they have given the larger part of their crops to landlords. They have had no stake in freedom.

The US Military Government first reduced maximum rents to one-third of crop yields. Later it transferred ownership of Japanese-held lands to the tenants, who cultivated them under a liberal purchase plan. The program was an outstanding economic achievement. Politically it took from the Communist Party all support in regions where it had been strong.

Five-sixths of the land in South Korea remained under the landlords, who had emerged from the Japanese occupation as the most powerful group in Korea. They dominated the major political parties, the Assembly and the administration of Syngman Rhee. They blocked all land reform in the Assembly; they choked the reform program which was finally enacted, by withholding appropriations.

In South Korea, where Japanese-held land was distributed by the US, the new owners tacked their titles to the land onto the doors of their huts.

In North Korea, land was distributed by the Communists, but no title was transferred. The government became the landlord. Loyalty to the regime took the place of subservience to the landlord as the price of a secure tenancy. The government collected as much in taxes and patriotic levies as the landlords had ever taken.

In clearing up the chaos which awaits the UN in Korea, transfer of title in a real land-reform program is basic to the achievement of democracy. It will need legislative approval after the elections. Meanwhile the task of the UN is to prevent the restoration of a feudal economy in areas where the Communists have come and gone.

Yet the transfer of land to the farmers is only the first step in raising agricultural productivity. The next steps are to train the new owners in farm management by extension work and to create a new agency to fulfill the functions of the landlord. Government *cannot* be that agency: the answer is rural coöperatives for purchasing, servicing and marketing. The Japanese once established farmers' and fishermen's coöperatives in Korea. The task of the UN is to organize them now.

Korea has become a test case for the UN and for the US. All Asia will judge us by our willingness to forgo special privilege there, and to build a sound society by UN action. We failed once. Now that the sacrifice of thousands of lives has given us a second chance, we cannot afford to fail again.

THE WEEK

"UNWISE, UNWORKABLE"

The Democratic leadership in the Senate is responsible for producing exactly the sort of "anti-Communist" bill President Truman has repeatedly warned against. Largely through the blundering and opportunism of Majority Leader Scott Lucas (Ill.), the Senate has passed a "Communist control" bill which contains word for word all the features of the Mundt-Ferguson-Nixon proposals that labor and liberals have opposed for years, together with new provisions for emergency detention of any person believed likely to engage in espionage or sabotage.

Several weeks before the question of anti-subversive legislation was to come up in the Senate, Administration members of the Judiciary Committee, which is in charge of such matters, took a private nose count which showed a heavy majority for something like Mundt-Ferguson or McCarran's omnibus internal-security bill. There was a general belief that the Red issue would be the key to this year's election and a general wish to get on record against "the Reds." Opponents of action so nearly approaching thought control feared that with this prevailing mood, they would not even be able to muster the necessary votes to sustain a Presidential veto. Frantic efforts were begun to frame a last-minute substitute that would have the desired political effect, without permanently curtailing individual liberties.

Senator Paul Douglas (D, Ill.) spent a weekend studying the problem and decided that the emergency-detention system established by the British during the last war might be the answer. Under that plan, extraordinary powers were granted law-enforcement officials to arrest and confine anyone suspected of spying or plotting against the government. Douglas convinced a handful of his liberal colleagues that they would make a far better showing against the McCarran-Mundt proposals by offering the British system as an alternative than by merely advocating tightening our present espionage and immigration laws as recommended by the President. Democratic Senators Kilgore (W. Va.), Kefauver (Tenn.), Graham (N. C.), Douglas (Ill.), Humphrey (Minn.), Lehman (N. Y.) and Benton (Conn.) jointly introduced the detention bill—promptly tagged a "Concentration Camp" plan by the press.

During the debate on the various Communist-control bills, it was often difficult to tell a liberal from a Mundt. Those espousing the detention plan

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(called the Kilgore bill) laid heavy stress on the "toughness" of their bill, to make it politically attractive. Senator Lucas explained that he was moving to substitute the detention plan for the catch-all McCarran bill because the latter "does not go far enough." Only 29 Senators preferred the Kilgore to the McCarran bill when the vote came.

In a private meeting in advance of the session, the supporters of the Kilgore compromise had agreed to stand out against final passage of the McCarran bill, regardless of what happened to their own measure. But when the Senate voted 45 to 29 against the Kilgore substitute, Senator Lucas so thoroughly confused the situation, by offering the Kilgore bill as an amendment to the McCarran-Mundt bill, that that pledge was promptly forgotten by most of those who had given it. Evidently aiming at outdoing Everett Dirksen, his Red-hunting opponent for the Senate from Illinois, Lucas began thumping the tub for a package bill containing every proposal that has been made by anybody. Liberal Senators like Douglas, Humphrey and Kilgore, surprised by Lucas' action, decided that, in the name of consistency, since they had attacked the original McCarran registration bill as being ineffective, they must support a combination measure which included their plan for toughening it up. Only seven (all Democrats) of the 29 Senators who had voted against the McCarran bill on the first test stood firm on the final vote: Graham (N. C.), Green (R. I.), Kefauver (Tenn.), Leahy (R. I.), Lehman (N. Y.), Murray (Mont.) and Taylor (Idaho). Seventy—38 Democrats and 32 Republicans—supported the measure.

Herbert Lehman was the only one of the 32 Senators up for reëlection this year who voted no. The former Governor withstood tremendous pressure to appease reactionary voters. "I feel that this legislation is unwise, unworkable and indefensible," Lehman told the Senate in the final minutes before the voting. "Some of my colleagues whom I highly respect will vote for the McCarran bill." But, he predicted, "the time will come when they will regret that."

Seldom have so few Senators felt the call of principle on a matter of such concern to the nation.

MONEY FOR TRUTH

Late last week, Senate and House conferees agreed tentatively to appropriate only $77 million for the Voice of America and allied activities. The Senate had previously approved $97 million, the whole sum the Administration had asked.

President Truman has repeatedly told Congress that "we shall never attain real security until people everywhere recognize that the free nations of the world are the true seekers of permanent peace." Until the US became involved in Korea, however, Congress refused to pay much attention to the problem.

In defense of the $20 million cut, the House conferees said that the reduction did not touch any direct propaganda activities, but merely reduced the money for collateral endeavors such as information libraries abroad, exchange-of-persons programs, and the like.

State Department officials believe, on the other hand, that if the war in Korea continues into another year, they ought to have $500 million to $1 billion, to offset Soviet propaganda in Europe and the Far East.

THE REARMING OF GERMANY

Western Germany will undoubtedly be partly rearmed to aid in the defense of Europe—but not just yet.

That is how matters stood at the beginning of this week following long and sharp dispute among the Big Three Foreign Ministers meeting in New York: Dean Acheson of the US, Ernest Bevin of Great Britain, and Robert Schuman of France. Later they were joined, but without altering the general outline of the results, by spokesmen for the nine other nations in the North Atlantic Pact—Canada, Italy, Norway, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Denmark, Portugal and Iceland.

The chief protagonists were the United States and France. Only a few days before the meeting of the Big Three, the US had suddenly announced its decision that Germany ought to supply large forces—perhaps as many as ten divisions—to be incorporated into European defense forces. No German unit would be larger than a division at most, or would be under a German commander; the US would supply the arms, on the assumption that little armament would be needed for at least a year.

France resisted the American proposal on several grounds: She had not been given time enough to consider such an important development, representing, from her point of view, a change in the American attitude; there aren't arms enough to go around, and supplying the countries in the North Atlantic Pact should come first; rearming Germany might hasten a Russian attack instead of postponing it; might lead to unification of the country; might restore the armament industry of the Ruhr. Behind all this, of course, lay France's traditional fear of her big neighbor, which has thrice crossed her borders in 70 years.

Britain, as so often in the past, was in the middle on this problem. With important reasons for clinging closely to both France and the US, she supported a compromise: give West Germany a substantial increase in her armed forces, but call them police. (France was not opposed to this, provided it did not upset the timetable for rearming the North Atlantic Pact nations—which means, practically, herself and Great Britain.) The US agreed that Germany should be last on the priority list.

Aiding the position of the United States were the new landings in Korea, restoring faith in our arms; the appointment of General George C. Marshall as Secretary of Defense; and our announced intention of increasing materially the American forces in Europe. Aiding us also was the steady ticking of the world clock warning us of Russian strength, Western weakness, and the growing danger of war.

The meeting of the Big Three, and especially America's role, got caustic criticism from several quarters, including notably James Reston of the New York *Times*. It was said that the US blundered in making public before the meeting its desire for German rearmament, thus tending to freeze other nations in their positions; that President Truman threw away a trump card when he revealed in advance that we would send more troops to Europe; that the meeting of the 12 Foreign Ministers should have preceded the meeting of the Big Three, instead of the reverse; that the time allotted for the meeting was far too brief; and that nothing had

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been properly prepared. The unofficial "official" answer to all this was that real agreements had been reached and progress had been made, that would show up later, perhaps months hence.

IT DOESN'T ALWAYS WORK

The victory of Senator Charles W. Tobey in the New Hampshire Republican primary is an important defeat for Tobey's colleague, Senator Styles Bridges, and for the China lobby.

Tobey's opponent was a young ex-Air Force tail-gunner, Wesley Powell, until recently administrative assistant in Senator Bridges' Washington office. Alfred Kohlberg, backroom boss of the China lobby in Washington, and other wealthy friends of Bridges, supplied Powell with lavish campaign funds. The state Republican machine, obedient to Bridges, deserted Tobey. The only newspaper with a statewide circulation, the *New Hampshire Union*, owned by William Loeb, poured out attacks on Tobey which outdid even Colonel McCormick for splenetic bias.

With money supplied by his fat-cat contributors, Powell treated New Hampshire citizens to free dinners, big parades and demonstrations, complete with brass bands and live elephants. He called Tobey "the darling of the CIO" and attacked him for voting with Truman and for criticizing Senator McCarthy. In his talks, Powell flirted with the idea of a preventive war and proclaimed on more than one occasion that he "would no more turn his back on McCarthy than Dean Acheson would turn his back on Alger Hiss."

The good sense shown by the voters of New Hampshire in withstanding the pressure of a campaign as dirty as those waged in Florida and North Carolina earlier this year has had an encouraging effect on other liberals who expect to be faced with similar trouble in November.

"Can't take any chance on having varmints around."

AS GOES MAINE?

Democratic campaign leaders and labor politicians are overjoyed by the election returns from Maine. Although the GOP, as usual, captured all three of Republican Maine's Congressional seats, the Trumanites find cause for celebration in the strong Democratic trend they find in the figures. And leading Maine Republicans privately agree.

In the First Congressional District, Mrs. Lucia Cormier, for the Democrats, received more than 41,000 votes, to come within 7,000 votes of defeating the three-term Republican incumbent, Robert Hale. Mrs. Cormier polled 10,000 more votes in this off-year election than the Democratic candidate had in 1948, with the Presidential ticket in the field. Democratic improvement in the Second and Third Districts was almost as great.

Statisticians for the Democrats point out that if the percentage gain scored by the Truman party in even the worst of the three Maine districts should be repeated across the country on November 7, Democrats would wipe out incumbent Republicans in 60 marginal districts. The realists in the party are reminding each other, however, that the Democrats in Maine this year had the rare combination of good candidates and a lot of hard work. Organized labor performed unusually well in getting out the vote.

But it is also true that the Maine election came at what could been a very poor time for the Democrats. That week the Korean war was going heavily against us; Louis Johnson was still in charge of Defense, and President Truman was in the midst of his trouble with the Marines. The Republican campaign was a down-the-line attack on every part of the Administration's record. That the Democratic candidates did so well in the face of these adverse conditions encourages Administration leaders to think that prospects for 1952 are looking up.

OUTSIDE AMERICA

France faces a long period of austerity. René Pleven said so in one of his recent speeches. In the fat old days before the first war, a Premier who dared to suggest such sacrilege in the holy place of the traditional French way of life—the kitchen—would have been risking his political life. Governments were overthrown for less serious threats to the patriotism of the ancient formula: *Vive la France et les pommes de terre frites!*

The new days after the second war were by French standards bad mostly because they were lean—also by French standards. The workers had little to put on their tables, but relatively poor Frenchmen ate more and better than relatively rich Englishmen. There was no starvation, no agonizing poverty of the southern Italian, Greek or Spanish kind. Everyone continued to take two hours for lunch. Nearly everyone developed a loathing for the (by French standards) monstrous mortification of the flesh that the English inflicted upon themselves in the name of austerity. The Crippsian word itself was in a class with Coca-Cola, hence politically dangerous.

Pleven used the word in a speech in which he also promised a serious crack-down on the Fifth Column. With-

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in little more than a week, the crackdown came: hundreds of foreign Communists were arrested, Communist organizations were proscribed, newspapers shut down. The French, who are logical to a fault, deduced that the Premier must mean business about austerity too.

Yet Pleven's use of the word added no decibels to the chorus of self-pitying grumbling that has become a permanent overtone of French public opinion. Instead of hurting him, the threat of austerity strengthened his political standing. He may be the first Premier since the war who has a chance of governing the French without lip service to the taboos of the cult (by now mythological) of France's *gloire, grandeur et gourmandise.*

Part of the reason is Pleven himself. More than any other French Premier since the war, he has had contact with and been influenced by Americans and Englishman without in any way becoming less French. He is young for a French statesman (49). His conception of realism refers to France's today and tomorrow, not her yesterdays. In his skill in domestic political wangling, he is the broken-field runner of Roosevelt's famous phrase. Even more valuable in the present juncture, he is sensitive to the psychological factors, can feel changes in the people's feelings, and, apparently, not only judge them accurately but also exploit them boldly.

The other, more important part of the reason is that the mood of the French is changing. They are still far from hopefulness, enthusiasm or Pleven's kind of realism, but they have gone a long way from the black, defeatist pessimism of last winter. One of many straws in the wind was an article by Etienne Gilson, member of the Academy and high pundit of neutralism, entitled "Echec": neutralism is beaten, appeasement is on the way out—and fast. If a gradual and grudging resignation to Atlanticism (including some austerity—by French standards) is better than foot-dragging resistance (including the chorus of self-pitying grumbling), then the change in the French mood can be called an improvement.

Korea is, of course, the factor which more than any other accounts for the change. France's pulling her weight in collective security is obviously the only alternative to staying out of the common craft and on a limb at a time when the Soviet cyclone may veer around to the Elbe or even the Rhine. But the aspect of the Korean situation that has most directly affected the mood of the French people is the human element—the way the American soldiers have fought. The fact that some of them fought badly, that strategy and tactics were far from perfect, that the Army and even the Marines were not invincible—all of this helped in France. Then the fact that the fighters got better, that they groused, continued to fight and learn by experience—all of this helped much more. That mythical creature—the American—became a practical and human reality in French eyes. He was cut down to a size the French could judge and—after a while—admire. The French, who used to think of themselves as warriors (until they began to think of themselves bitterly as America's cannon-fodder) saw in the Americans in Korea warriors at whose side they would prefer to fight (if they had to fight).

The general pattern of the world political situation is plainly pre-military. The French therefore accept Pleven's raising the term of military service to 18 months. They are even swallowing a more bitter pill—German rearmament. Both labor and management are screaming protests against Pleven's minimum-wage and collective-bargaining decree, but labor nevertheless recognizes the truth of his statement that it is the first measure of its kind in recent French history, and management knows he is honest about considering the price and inflation dangers.

Coca-colonization is a less useful peg for Communist propaganda since President Truman dressed down General MacArthur; and Pleven has had better standing since he instructed Foreign Minister Schuman to back up the British on stopping the counterattack in Korea (when it gets started) at the 38th Parallel.

But the basic reason for the change in the French mood is that, beyond and above all the warnings of the French intellectuals that there must be equality of sacrifice, the people see in Korea proof of the Americans' willingness to accept inequality—with themselves on the heavy side of the balance. Equalization takes on a new meaning in proportion as an American exceptionalism (which seemed to mean immunity) tends to decrease. Korea more than cancels out the French "sacrifices" in Indo-China because, though many Frenchmen considered the war in Indo-China "dirty," very few (outside the Communists of course) fail to find the one in Korea clean.

And perhaps the most powerful reason on the unconscious level is the effect of the difference, since Korea, in what the French call the American "presence" in Europe. Since the start of the Cold War, and more acutely since the Marshall Plan began to become militarized—without any imminent military threat which the French could see—the "presence" had seemed full of invisible but ubiquitous pressures. The French stopped worrying about American isolation and grumbled about the American "presence." Now many factors, including the echoes of the Republican Party's efforts to gear American policy to Asia instead of Europe, have shown what the variety of isolation preached by the neutralists might mean for France. The lesson seems to be—on the unconscious level of popular psychology—that direct and forceful "projection" of America into Europe is not a good way to help cement the Atlantic community, European federation or any other kind of coöperative system. American policy will not abandon Europe, but it no longer appears that the best way of wooing Europeans is to drown them with assurances that tend to wash out their own impulses of coöperation.

By being forced to shift its attention to Asia and domestic problems, American policy has also been forced to take some pressure off Europe. The result has been, not a loss but a gain. Pleven is able to use, as a Frenchman talking to Frenchmen, a word like austerity, which was utterly hateful when its implications were British. He is able to suggest, without political disaster, that his countrymen will not be able to eat as well as they did when the Americans were helping load the tables of a France which no longer can count on the Americans to make it *eternelle.*

PERCY WINNER

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WHY JOHNSON WAS FIRED

by R. S. Allen & W. V. Shannon

GENERAL BOB GINSBURG, public-relations aide in the office of the Secretary of Defense, is an old hand around the Pentagon. Twenty years ago he was ghosting St. Patrick's Day speeches for Secretary of War Pat Hurley which won praise for their "characteristic Irishness." On one wall of his office is a framed motto, "Consider the turtle. He makes progress only when his neck is out."

Ginsburg's outgoing boss, 59-year-old Secretary Louis Johnson, stuck his neck out so many times in his 17 months in the Pentagon that he finally had it chopped off. It was inevitable that this would happen from the day he took office.

When the decapitation finally took place, there wasn't a wet eye in Washington. Johnson did not have a friend in the Cabinet or a pal in the White House. Even the American Legion, which gave Johnson his start, was unhappy about him.

Johnson's feud with Secretary of State Acheson was sufficient reason for his dismissal. Yet Johnson made unification a working reality, he streamlined the military establishment, and, above all, he broke the back of the "admirals' revolt." His was the tough luck of being hit with a war for which the generals were completely unprepared.

Johnson had nothing to do with the failure, both by the Central Intelligence Agency and, more notably, by MacArthur's G-2 in Tokyo, to warn America of the Korean invasion. The decision to withdraw US forces from Korea was made long before he took office. The size of the pre-Korean Army was fixed in 1947 by the Republican-controlled Congress at a time when Johnson wasn't even a rumor on the Washington scene. The deplorable training and equipment of the troops initially rushed to Korea was not primarily the fault of Johnson. The editors of *U. S. News and World Report*, headed by that oracle of conservatism and harsh critic of Johnson, David Lawrence, declared, "Troops from the forces of General Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander in Japan, proved to be the least well trained, the least conditioned for combat, of all American troops in Korean fighting. General MacArthur was among the last to recognize that fighting in Korea was serious." Finally, the fact that, five years after World War II, we still have no modern tanks is the responsibility of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Robert S. Allen and William V. Shannon are co-authors of The Truman Merry-Go-Round, published this week. Allen, co-author of the original Washington Merry-Go-Round, is Washington correspondent of the New York Post. Shannon is a magazine writer now living in the Capital.

When Johnson stalked into the Pentagon in March, 1949, he inherited three basic problems: lack of agreement on primary strategic issues, fierce dissension among the services, and gross waste, duplication and extravagance. In a word, unification was a failure. Johnson set out to make it work.

Johnson quickly came to a decision on the big strategic issues. He decided to back strategic air power. B-36s carrying atom bombs and using them in retaliation for an initial attack would be America's main "force in being." They remain so today.

As part of this decision, Johnson wielded the ax on the 65,000-ton super-aircraft carrier which the Navy had started building without authorization from Congress. Shortly thereafter the admirals staged their revolt.

Johnson handled this uprising with what was, for him, remarkable deftness. He allowed Navy Secretary Francis Matthews and General Omar Bradley to carry the ball. It was Matthews who received most of the brickbats of the frenzied Navy partisans, and it was Bradley who gave them the *coup de grâce.*

Bradley recalled to the House Armed Forces Committee the Pearl Harbor disaster and pointed out that it could have been avoided by "complete understanding, coöperation and trust" among the services. "That fatal day," he said, "should have taught all military men that our forces are one team, in the game to win regardless of who carried the ball. This is no time for 'Fancy Dans' who won't hit the line with all they have on every play, unless they can call the signals."

It is worthwhile to recall Bradley's words. For they are a measure of the bitter feelings Johnson had to contend with. Not until the major strategic issues had been resolved and the gross insubordination of the admirals been dealt with, could the armed forces be in a position to fight any kind of war. Johnson made those decisions and crushed the revolt. He accomplished the indispensable preliminaries.

James Forrestal, Johnson's predecessor, opposed the steady reduction in military appropriations. Johnson, sensing public sentiment, led the parade. He was wrong, but who among us can cast the first stone? Certainly not the Republicans. They incited his economy efforts. It is forgotten now that it was the GOP, led by Herbert Hoover, who clamored that $1.5 billion be slashed from the 1949 military budget.

Such critics, of course, were in the happy position of bearing no responsibility for events. Johnson was responsible for a situation in which the military dis-

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parity between Russia's strength and America's weakness was growing day by day. Still worse, Johnson concealed the disparity with typical boasts of our readiness to swamp Russia at a moment's notice. These boasts were misleading at the time and in the glare of Korea they became a hollow joke.

In the months before Korea, Johnson was riding high. His economy program was winning general praise. A surreptitious Presidential boom for Johnson was well under way. Although anything but a liberal, he was making covert gestures toward labor and Negro groups. Johnson's ambitions were pushing him rapidly into the dangerous position of Administration "strong man."

It seemed as if the big man from West Virginia had arrived at last. No one could say that Johnson had not battled his way upward all his life. Son of a small-time grocer and grandson of one of Robert E. Lee's dashing lieutenants, he early showed his get-up-and-go spirit. He still has the first 50-cent piece he earned selling beans he had grown.

This aggressiveness finally paid off in 1948 when Johnson took over the financial end of Truman's campaign, when others wouldn't touch it with a ten-foot pole. He produced contributions from many places, especially big oil. His success made a strong impression on Truman. However, it did not endear Johnson to National Chairman J. Howard McGrath or to his successor, Bill Boyle. Those "well-informed sources close to the White House" who for so long kept hinting at Johnson's imminent departure were usually in the Democratic National Committee.

Being Secretary of Defense is the kind of job that only a rough-and-tough operator can relish. The rivalries among the services are bitter and ceaseless. In 1949, not only were the admirals seething, but the Secretaries of the Army, Navy and Air Force were jealous of their nominal superior. Navy Secretary Sullivan resigned in an explosion over the junked aircraft carrier, and Air Secretary Stuart Symington opposed Johnson from the first. The Secretary of Defense is also wedged in between the chairmen of the House and Senate Armed Forces Committees, two hard-boiled old-timers named Carl Vinson and Millard Tydings.

In addition Johnson was opposed by all who were loyal to James Forrestal. He was in no way responsible for Forrestal's failures and his long overdue ouster. Forrestal's shortcomings were strictly his own. Of him it can be truly said that he was not the man he appeared to be. Never did anyone turn so misleading a countenance toward the world as James Forrestal. His grim, taut expression, flat, broken nose, thin almost non-existent lips, and compact set of his body, all gave the impression of a man who was self-possessed, resolute and effective. The exact opposite was the case. Forrestal never tackled a problem or conflict head-on and four-square.

One man who was never taken in by the Forrestal mystique was Harry Truman. Truman also had no illusions regarding Johnson. But despite the painful jolts in Korea and all the attacks both fair and unfair on Johnson, he was secure as long as he remained a loyal member of the President's "team." The day Johnson began his campaign to undermine Acheson, he was finished. He had committed the one unforgivable crime in Truman's eyes—disloyalty to the team.

Johnson's foolish and destructive vendetta against Acheson all but destroyed effective coöperation within the government. It let the Department of Defense get out of control. Yet it represented no conflict of principle. Johnson was motivated simply by a lust for power.

Acheson once told a news conference that "wherever a situation of weakness exists in Asia or Europe, it is not only an invitation but an irresistible invitation for the Soviet government to fish in those troubled waters. To ask them not to fish, and to say that we will have an agreement that you won't fish, is like trying to deal with a force of nature. You can't argue with a river; it is going to flow. You can dam it up, you can put it to useful purposes, you can deflect it, but you can't argue with it."

In that little parable, Acheson might just as well have been describing his restless adversary.

To Johnson's credit, it must be said that at first he restrained himself. During his first year, he had two major bouts with the State Department. One was over Tito, whom Johnson did not favor aiding until he gave ironclad guarantees. The other was over Formosa, where he took the usual military line recently openly promulgated by General MacArthur. On both these issues, Johnson lost—and shut up. This is more than can be said for Forrestal, who never stopped undercutting our policy in Palestine and Latin America.

But with the rising tide of attacks on Acheson, Johnson could not resist the urge to usurp some of the authority of his embattled colleague. On the issues of German rearmament and aid to Franco Spain, Johnson openly derided Acheson's views before Congressional committees. This shows how careless, and stupid, Johnson finally became. Anyone who knows anything in Washington is aware that the last place for a Cabinet member to do any personal sniping is in the alleged secrecy of a Congressional committee.

Too late, Johnson learned how stupid he had been. In the final weeks, he made frantic efforts to restore himself to favor with the President. But the damage had been done, because in attacking Acheson's policies, Johnson had attacked Truman's policies. And they were the right policies, carried on to prevent the spread of war at a terribly delicate and dangerous time.

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SHOULD WE REARM GERMANY?

by B. H. Liddell Hart

THE SILVER LINING of the clouds that overhang Western Europe is the improvement that has recently developed in relations between the French and the Germans. It is remarkable to see how the ancient enmity is giving way to a sense of European communion.

The Schuman Plan plays the part of both parent and child in this happier development. Whatever fault may be found in its detailed design, it has lifted Franco-German relations out of old ruts and suspicion and hate onto a higher and better plane.

Only experts can attempt to assess the economic value of this plan for joint control of the French and German coal and steel industries. What leads the great majority to welcome the proposed industrial union is an appreciation of its value as a step toward Franco-German political union, or at least as a means of bridging the long-standing gulf between the two countries. Even those who are dubious about its economic results believe this factor to be far outweighed by the political and psychological benefits.

This mood of receptivity is the outward and visible sign of a potentially epoch-making change in the French attitude toward the Germans, and registers the growth of a feeling of mutual dependence—that the two peoples stand or fall together.

At the same time I found on a recent visit to the Continent a marked willingness in France to consider the logical extension of the plan's political implications: that the association of the two peoples should be accompanied by their association in mutual defense against the obvious threat of invasion that hangs over them both.

In military quarters there was a greater disposition to study the problem. But it was here that I found the clearest definition of the arguments against rearming the Germans, to reinforce the defense of the West.

The first is based on the French people's deep-seated distrust of the Germans, their fear as to what line the Germans would take once they were armed again, and the way that this fear would hinder rapid and adequate rearmament.

A second argument is: "Any attempt to rearm the Germans is likely to prove a *casus belli*, and precipitate a Russian invasion before the build-up of defensive strength could be accomplished."

A third is: "A rearmed Western Germany might drag the French into an avoidable conflict through its impulse to liberate Eastern Germany."

A fourth is: "We must rearm ourselves before there can be any question of rearming Germany, and we have need of as much equipment as the USA can provide—if it had to be spread more widely it could only be at the expense of our own rearmament."

A fifth argument is: "It would be unwise that we should appear to be begging for German help, and better to wait until an effective defense of the West has been rebuilt—then we could invite Western Germany to come in as an additional partner, without fostering the feeling there that we are dependent on her support."

Nevertheless it seems doubtful that the total of what France, Britain, Belgium and Holland could raise, and the USA contribute, would adequately span the gap in Western defense.

It is not only a matter of the additional number required. The experience of the French collapse in 1940 has left an impression that is difficult to remove. Anyone can sense that the other Western peoples doubt the moral capacity of the French to bear a heavy strain—and it is all too evident that many Frenchmen share these doubts. Thus a covering force that was mainly French in composition might not inspire adequate confidence. All the people concerned, whatever their fears of a rearmed Germany, seem to feel that no covering force would be stout enough in moral fiber to withstand a Russian invasion, except with a strong German stiffening. For that reason even those who fear that such a development might precipitate an invasion are beginning to feel that it may be the lesser of two serious risks.

What do the Germans feel about the matter? That was the primary question I went to Germany to investigate, visiting in turn each of the three zones—the French, American and British. I talked with a wide variety of people, ranging from Cabinet ministers, representatives of the Socialist opposition, and local party leaders in the different *Länder*, to former generals, representatives of the ordinary ex-servicemen, and university students.

At Bonn, the federal capital, I found in government as well as in opposition quarters a strongly expressed unwillingness to rearm even if the occupying powers were willing to sanction it.

The Chancellor, Dr. Konrad Adenauer, was away, but I had a long discussion with the Minister of Finance, Dr. Fritz Schaeffer, whom many regard as the ablest member of Adenauer's team. He spoke mainly about the

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This is the third and last of a series of articles on the defense of Europe.

Captain B. H. Liddell Hart is a well-known British military expert, author of nearly 30 books, mostly in the fields of tactics and strategy. General Guderian, creator and trainer of Germany's armored forces, who made the breakthrough at Sedan and led the drive to the Channel in 1940, has said of him: "I was one of Captain Liddell Hart's disciples in tank affairs."

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Schuman Plan, and set forth strong arguments for believing that the creation of a uniform market, which would facilitate production and increase demand, would raise the people's standard of life in all the associated states.

But Schaeffer, like Schuman, regarded the "spiritual" promise of the plan as even more important than its economic benefits. Enmity between France and Germany had been nearly fatal to Europe. The plan was promoting "Franco-German reconciliation," and once that basic problem was solved he believed a quick development of European union would be possible—otherwise there would always be two camps. For this reason, above all, "we should be appreciative if the British government could find a way to participate," now that France and Germany are at last clasping hands.

When I asked Schaeffer his views about a German contribution to the defense of Western Europe he showed evident distaste for the possibility. He felt that any attempt to recreate a German Army might provoke Russia to launch a "preventive war," and the more so since the formation of any effective force would take a considerable time. In such a war Germany would be the battlefield, and likely to suffer worse destruction than ever—this time with atomic devastation added.

He went on to say that the youth of Germany were disillusioned not only about war, but about the value of defense by fighting, following their experience in the last stages of World War II, in 1944-45. That would add to the difficulty of raising an army afresh, even as part of a collective "European" force. Even if the Allies changed their minds about keeping Western Germany disarmed, the time for her rearming was past. "Western Germany must rely for its defense on the occupying powers." Schaeffer, however, did not seem to have much confidence in their capacity to defend Western Germany —he was too clear-sighted to cherish illusions—and he was uncertain how far Americans would be willing to sacrifice themselves for Europe's sake. He left me with the impression that he considered the problem of defense to be insoluble and preferred to concentrate on the problem of Franco-German reconciliation, which *could* be solved—on the lines of the Schuman Plan.

Leaders of the Socialist party, however, made clear their intention to oppose such a solution. Their objection was expressed not so much on Socialist grounds, as in England, but on nationalist grounds—that it would tend to maintain restrictions on German steel production. (Schaeffer had expressed willingness to make economic concessions to France to obtain political coöperation and a better spirit.) It is ironical that German Socialists, who have so long stood for internationalism, should take such a line. It is bound to give the impression that they are primarily concerned to bid for votes, by playing up to the resurgent spirit of nationalism. But they, too, expressed a wish that the British government would take part in the Schuman Plan discussions, as a safeguard, instead of remaining aloof.

On the question of German rearmament the Socialist spokesmen expressed the same objections as Schaeffer, but added the further one that it would endanger democracy. The Army might too easily become the master of the state, instead of its servant, and all the more easily because of the general weakness of Western Germany's present situation.

The reluctance to rearm that has been shown by the heads of all the main parties in Germany may appear too good to be true. Is it genuine, or is it merely a show of reluctance with the motive of making the Western powers more eager to press arms on the Germans and lighten their own burden?

It is natural that the Germans see the advantages of being wooed. It is even more natural that they should get a sardonic enjoyment from the fact that the very countries which were so intent on rooting out everything military in Germany, and dismantling her factories, should now be coming to recognize they cannot defend themselves without German help.

Even so, I believe the prevailing objection to rearming is genuine, though not necessarily lasting. The further I extended my soundings, the more evident it became that the views expressed by the various party leaders in Bonn represented the dominant trend of opinion. The majority of the people are passivist, if not pacifist. That has been the effect of two catastrophic wars, two prolonged occupations, and soul-shaking disillusionment.

Among the younger generation, particularly, there is a widespread repugnance to the idea of military service. They or their elder brothers were taken from the schoolroom at 15 to serve in anti-aircraft defense, felt the horror and hopelessness of withstanding the mass bombing of their home towns, and when scarcely older were sent into the field, with the barest minimum of training and equipment, to face an invasion vastly superior in numbers or mechanized-weapon power, or both. These young men had experience only of defeat, in a most bitter form, and were left with a conviction of the futility of defense.

The "war generation" proper, somewhat older, had immense gaps torn in its ranks—by death in battle or Russian captivity. Its survivors have confidence in themselves, founded on their well-proved prowess as soldiers, but they have little confidence in anything or anybody else—political leaders, national ideals, or the value of sacrifice where there is no reasonable chance of its proving effective. Most of them have been cured, at least temporarily, of the romanticism that has cost the Germans so dearly. They want "to cultivate their gardens."

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At the same time they have no faith in the capacity of the occupying powers to defend Western Germany or Western Europe. Their own experience of how easily they overran the other Western countries in 1940 makes them more dubious about joining up to serve as a segment of a defense largely consisting of these weak and still shaky neighbors. With so poor a chance, why take part, they ask, in a defense that will merely expose their homeland, their families and themselves to more destruction and worse treatment by the Russians? It is apparent that many feel more might be gained, or at least saved, by remaining passive, ready to submit quietly to the invaders if they come.

Among the ex-servicemen who are more disposed to fight, other checks still operate. They are bitter about the way they were treated after the war, not only by the Allies but by their own countrymen. Ex-regulars are disgruntled at having been deprived of their pension rights—in contrast to the civil servants and teachers who also served the Nazi regime—and about their government's delay in paying the pensions since the Allies canceled their unjust ruling.

Another "delayed-action" check has developed from resentment about the war-crimes sentences. Most Germans at first were indifferent about these, especially where generals suffered, but interest increased and a change of feeling developed over the trial of Field Marshal von Mannstein. There is widespread complaint over the Allies' keeping German officers in prison, as a punishment for the steps they were driven to take in combating Communist guerrillas, now that the Allies themselves have had their eyes opened to the ruthlessness of such guerrillas and the ubiquitous menace they present. Germans comment sharply on the reports of the drastic measures taken by the French in Indo-China, the British in Malaya, and the Americans in Korea. Many of them say that they would not consider fighting alongside the Allies so long as their own old comrades and chiefs remain in prison.

Still more common is the comment that the Western powers can hardly expect Germans to take up arms in defense of "their democracy" after all that has been done for five years to discredit the German Army and to make them feel that it was sinful to wear a uniform. While such comments are apt to be off the mark in some respects, it is true that the Allies have succeeded in extirpating German "militarism" to an extent that may now be a handicap to a change of policy.

In the course of my tour I met a number of generals whom I had known before the war or had come to know while exploring its history. Generals may be expected to believe in military service for defense. It was significant that most of them admitted the majority of their countrymen now were opposed to it.

Even more significantly, one of the former heads of the General Staff expressed himself against any attempt to rearm:

> European defense is a problem without solution. The English, Dutch and Americans are too few, the French and Italians unreliable. Only strong German forces—say, 40 divisions—could suffice to stop the Russians. But German rearmament is impossible, on every ground—international, political, domestic. The war generation is disillusioned and sick of war. They are interested only in providing for themselves and their families. They have no ideal for which to fight. The younger generation are struggling to find one, and may find it in "Europeanism."

The most that he thought feasible was the creation of a gendarmerie strong enough to protect Western Germany from invasion by East German "police," yet not strong enough to be able to fight Russia. "That might be politically practicable, but it would be foolish and dangerous to dream of expanding such a force into an army adequate for defense against direct attack by Russia herself."

Some of the other generals were more optimistic, particularly von Manteuffel, the most brilliant Panzer leader in the later stages of the war. He now lives at Neuss, near the Ruhr, where he has succeeded in establishing himself in a good industrial job, unlike most of his unemployed and impoverished fellow officers. He talked at length about the possibility, which he had propounded to Adenauer, of quickly creating an army of 30 or more divisions if equipment were provided.

> It would have to be a fully equipped force, comprising all arms, for the Germans would not be willing to serve merely as auxiliary cannon fodder. But as its weapons and ammunition would be supplied by the Western powers, not by a German arms industry, that should be an effective reassurance against a German army's becoming a new menace to them—since they could cut off its supplies at any time.

Von Manteuffel, however, did not go into the question of how long it would take America to furnish the equipment for an army on his proposed scale, or what forestalling action the Russians might take.

An intermediate view was expressed by General Blumentritt, formerly Chief of Staff in the West to Field Marshal von Rundstedt. He said that probably 60 to 70 percent of the Germans were against recreating an army, and would be unwilling to serve in it. "But the best defense nowadays is by relatively small forces of high quality, and the number of men required could be recruited, on a voluntary basis, from the proportion that want a chance to defend themselves." While it must be a first-rate army, air support as well as arms supply might be left to the Allies, who could thus curb its independent use. Moreover, as a further safeguard, its divisions might be kept separate from one another, and

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intermingled with divisions from the other countries.

Here I would add that, while some generals obviously desired the revival of an independent German army, a considerable number concentrated on the idea of creating a "European army," containing German divisions along with others. They were quite prepared to accept the idea that these would serve under an American, British or French higher command. In view of their own professional eminence, that attitude was noteworthy.

In concluding this survey of the problem, and the different facets of opinion, a few reflections may be emphasized. Views are changing rapidly in Germany, as in other countries. Even while I was there, I could observe the swing, following the invasion of South Korea. People were quick to see that a similar pattern might be repeated in Western Germany. Many who had resisted the idea of any rearmament, and reconciled themselves to passivity, began to show signs of wanting the chance to defend themselves—at any rate against an invasion by East German "police" or other Russian satellites. In the weeks that have followed, the swing has become more pronounced, and is reflected in Adenauer's new request for permission to form a fully-armed gendarmerie equal to that in the Soviet Zone—at least 50,000 strong. He may be in advance of the main body of West German opinion, but is probably not much ahead of the swing.

Any fresh and bigger step would have a better chance of acceptance if it were planned within the framework of a European army, and as a German contribution to it. The "European" idea has caught the imagination of the German people, and of the younger generation above all.

It would probably be easy to obtain sufficient volunteers, from war-trained men alone, to form an army of 10 to 20 divisions—as a reinforcement to the present Allied covering force in the West. I have been assured by experts that the organization could be created in a very short time, while the number of volunteers required might be recruited almost overnight. But to pay the upkeep of such a force would be more difficult as long as the West German economy has to carry the present heavy burden of occupation costs.

Beyond this lies the far more difficult problem of providing adequate equipment for anything more than a lightly-armed police force. As things stand, it would take a long time, and during that building-up process the risk of a Russian preventive invasion would be heavy.

It might be more feasible to begin by forming a small "International Force" or "European Legion" of directly enlisted volunteers from all the Western countries. Germans could join such a force not only as enlisted men but as officers. It would be a useful supplement to the national contingents at present contributed by the different countries to the Western Union covering force, and its scale could be progressively increased.

NEW HOPE FOR THE MENTALLY RETARDED

by Bruce Bliven

AN EVENT took place the other day in New York City which was a significant landmark in regard to the problem of serious mental deficiency.

At the New York Medical School there was opened the first clinic in America—and as far as is known, in the world—to deal exclusively with mentally-retarded children. At this clinic, says Dr. Lawrence Slobody, its director, the mentally-retarded child will be studied as a whole; every physical or mental condition that contributes to his problem will be taken up, and medical aid of every type necessary will be given. How great is the need for this sort of treatment is indicated by the fact that within a few days after the clinic opened, it was booked solid with patients *for a whole year ahead.*

Few people realize the gravity of this problem. There are 1.5 million American homes with a member of the family whose intelligence quotient is 70 or lower; even the best individuals in this group can never hold a job, except perhaps doing unskilled manual labor under close direction. They cannot be trusted to travel alone on a public conveyance, or to buy anything in a store and come back with the right change, or to look anything up in the encyclopedia. While the largest number in the group are of course toward the top end of the scale, they taper off toward those dreadful accidents of nature who are unable to dress themselves or use table utensils or care for the simplest human needs.

Most of them have personality problems as well. If they are not utterly passive, vegetable-like beings, they are over-aggressive, restless and excitable, a sore trial to everyone with whom they come into contact. The great majority of juvenile delinquents come from those with subnormal intelligence, though not necessarily the extremely retarded whom I have been discussing. It is a disturbing thought that in addition to this group of 1.5 million there are 7.5 million with IQs between 70 and 80, who, if they can support themselves at all, are doomed for life to badly-paid, dull, repetitive jobs with no real hope of advancement. Another group of more than 22 million have IQs between 80 and 90. They, also, are barred from "making a success" in life, in the ordinary understanding of that phrase. They con-

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stitute an obvious difficulty for a democracy, in this modern world which demands so many and such complicated decisions of its citizens, such discernment to detect and puncture the plausible falsehoods of the demagogue.

Science has been studying the problems of mental retardation lately, with a number of significant developments which I can only summarize within the limits of this article. One of the most important of these is the now firmly-rooted recognition that a mentally-retarded child is an accident that can happen in any family, and not a proof of some fault in the parents. In the overwhelming majority, there is no hereditary factor whatever (though among normal individuals, parents of any given level of intelligence will usually have a child who has, or seems to have, roughly the IQ of his parents). As the facts about serious retardation have sunk in, there has been a tremendous change in the attitude of the parents of such a child. They no longer tend to "hide him in the attic," but try openly to get the help they need—help like, for instance, the clinic at the New York Medical School.

The (nationwide) Association for the Help of Retarded Children, Inc., was set up not long ago, with a membership of these parents, to consolidate many such groups which have already been organized on a local or statewide scale. They are seeking: (1) special schools where necessary, and special facilities in existing schools, for retarded children; (2) new or enlarged institutions for the children who should not continue to live at home, of whom there are many; (3) greatly improved and expanded clinical facilities; (4) a national educational campaign to teach everybody that retarded children are no disgrace, that they can be assisted, and that they are entitled to public aid.

Science has discarded the old ideas about "the Jukes and the Kallikaks"—families of the feeble-minded in whom low intelligence is handed down from generation to generation, and goes with alcoholism, prostitution and crime. The experts today believe that poverty is the primary cause of these things—including what sometimes seems like low intelligence but is not—rather than the other way 'round.

While some of the causes of mental retardation are still obscure, much has been learned about them in the recent past. The cells of the brain are delicate, and damage done to them is usually irreparable; an "instrument birth" may cause such damage. Evidence is beginning to accumulate that the use of certain types of anesthetics to ease the pain of childbirth can also do harm, and for this reason the experts welcome the recent swing of the pendulum back toward natural delivery.

German measles, experienced by the expectant mother during the first three months of pregnancy, can produce a retarded child. So can certain infections in early childhood, including some which are masked by other diseases. For example, sleeping sickness sometimes occurs with measles, without being detected at the time, and leaves the brain tissues permanently impaired. (Oddly enough, damage of this sort can be detected, many years later, by means of the Rorschach test.)

A third common cause of retardation is accidents resulting from some failure of function between conception and birth; somehow the genes of the parents just fail to "match up" to produce a healthy child with an adequate flow of properly oxygenated blood to the brain, and proper processes there, including the electrical ones. Incompatibility of the Rh factor in the parents is under some suspicion. Severe nutritional deficiency on the part of the expectant mother can also do irrevocable damage.

It is also true, of course, that retarded mentality can be hereditary. The genes can be damaged, as with X-rays or other radioactivity, and this damage can be passed on to successive generations. Nevertheless, the chance that this will happen is far less than is commonly supposed and accounts for only a small minority of the cases.

Much has recently been learned about the environment of very young children, as determining their intelligence level throughout life. Semi-starvation, or a badly-balanced diet, or any great physical or mental shock, can cause a sharp lowering of the mental level, which can be temporary or permanent. It is noteworthy that children taken out of great squalor and neglect and put into foster homes where they are given loving care, sometimes seem to advance in intelligence many points in a few months.

As you may have heard, there is a common chemical substance which, when fed to mentally-retarded children in amounts very much larger than occur in nature, has the result of improving the IQ, perhaps as much as 15 to 20 points—which can make an enormous difference in the life pattern of the individual. This substance is one special form of glutamic acid, a common foodstuff, one of the "building blocks" of all proteins. (I shall not say which form it is, since it should be administered only by well-trained experts.) The pioneers in this work, Dr. Frederic T. Zimmerman and Dr. Bessie Burgemeister, first worked with rats, and found a substantial improvement in their ability to learn the intricacies of a maze. Since then, experiments with large numbers of children, in many places and over a number of years, appear to demonstrate beyond question that both intelligence and emotional stability are substantially improved. Under continuous therapy, the improvement goes on for about a year, at which time a ceiling seems to be reached. While there is a certain amount of permanency in the improvement, depending upon dosage and duration of treatment, it is usually necessary to con-

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tinue the therapy to maintain the full improvement. (The massive effect, as I have suggested, takes place only in children who are seriously retarded.)

Not only do subnormal children improve during this period of about a year; they often improve *twice as fast as do normal children* during the same length of time. In addition to the improvement in power to think and in emotional stability, manual dexterity is aided, to a lesser extent.

An improvement of 15 or 20 points in the IQ can make a big difference in the happiness of the individual and those around him. If his IQ is in the 60s, for example, it may mean that the difficulties I mentioned earlier can be cleared away. The individual can then travel alone on public conveyances, make purchases and bring back the right change, perhaps even get and hold a not-too-taxing job.

All experts in this field are agreed that the greatest single difficulty is teaching parents of a mentally-retarded child how to meet their problem. They tend to make one or the other of two mistakes: either they are too strict with the child, tending to punish him for things that are not his fault, or they go to the opposite extreme and are over-indulgent and soft, spoiling him and making his problem even worse. One of the important tasks of the national association recently created is to educate parents to steer a successful middle course between these extremes.

UNESCO'S NEW TASKS

by Julian Huxley

THIS YEAR'S conference at Florence, the fifth General Conference of UNESCO, marked the end of UNESCO's first period, when it was tentatively exploring its field of operation. From now on for a considerable time we may, I think, take it that both the nature and the extent of its domain, and also the types and methods of its operations within that domain, have been fairly well defined.

From the early days of the Preparatory Commission onwards (early days, though not yet five years back!), two contrary tendencies have been at work in UNESCO. Its Charter states that the organization shall promote peace and security, by means of education, science and culture. One school of thought wished to judge UNESCO's program by its direct and immediate contribution to peace in the present; the other laid stress on the indirect but indispensable contribution of education, science and culture to the peaceful One World of the future.

The former believed that UNESCO could and should play a certain political role, and be concerned with peace in the essentially negative sense of preventing the outbreak of wars. The latter felt that this task could only properly be undertaken by a primarily political organization—in this case the UN in general and the Security Council in particular—and that the peace which UNESCO could promote was what Archibald MacLeish called positive peace: fuller living in a world from which the threat of war had been banished. However, in doing this, they argued, UNESCO might be making an indirect contribution to political peace, for instance by aiding in the removal of the inequalities of opportunity which are among the tensions leading to unrest and war.

This was the view which I adopted when I became Director-General, and which was in general accepted by the Executive Board and the first three General Conferences. This implied that the program should consist mainly of a rather large series of projects, none of them singly of outstanding importance for world peace, but collectively forming the necessary foundation for any future peaceful world. To change the metaphor, that future unitary world will demand for its persistence a single fabric of worldwide scope underlying all aspects of human life. Each project of UNESCO constitutes only a single thread for such a fabric.

With a program of this kind, it was possible for captious journalists and other critics to hold up particular projects to ridicule or abuse. Why should UNESCO spend taxpayers' money on preparing a new copyright convention or teaching illiterate Africans or Indians to read and write? What relevance to world peace is there in projects for better abstracting of papers in medical science, or for helping nations to preserve their historical monuments? Such criticism can only be met by educating the general public—and also the intellectuals and the legislators—of member states as to the impracticality of more spectacular ideas; by showing the impossibility of UNESCO's producing the rabbit of political peace out of a cultural and scientific hat; and by explaining the need for slow, patient work and its long-term value.

However, there has always been a minority, including some important and influential people, who believed and proclaimed that UNESCO should reduce the number of projects in its program, and should devote itself more to those with a direct bearing on immediate peace.

Julian Huxley, well-known British scientist and writer, was for several years Director-General of UNESCO. Author of many books in the general field of biology and his specialty, zoology, he has taught at several universities, been Secretary of the London Zoological Society and served as a member of the famous "Brains Trust" on the BBC.

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When he was appointed Director-General, Señor Jaime Torres-Bodet let it be known that he shared this view. However, the logic of the world situation in general, and of UNESCO's limitations in particular, seems to have been too much for him. In any event, the program for 1951 presented to the Florence Conference was, in both its general form and much of its detailed content, similar to those of earlier years.

At this meeting, Torres-Bodet pleaded for more money for UNESCO; and on this point he has my personal sympathy. When, at the first UNESCO Conference, I pressed for a budget of somewhere around $10 million, I was told (probably quite rightly) that UNESCO must learn how to do its work, and accordingly must start in a small way; but it was strongly hinted that if things went well, the budget could be expected to rise steadily, reaching $10 million in perhaps three or four years. However, this never happened.

The Florence Conference was marked by one innovation—the recognition of special projects which might be financed from sources outside the regular budget, with its automatic assessment of all member states.

One of the projects is UNESCO's share in the execution of that part of President Truman's Point Four program which provides technical assistance to underdeveloped areas. The $20 million available under this plan will be split up among the UN and the various specialized agencies. The portion given to UNESCO will be of considerable assistance to it, especially in financing fellowships for men from underdeveloped countries to study the latest methods of general and technical education, or conducting literacy campaigns, or promoting a richer cultural life.

More spectacular will be the schemes for reëducation and other aspects of UNESCO work in Germany. A sum of nearly $300,000 is available under this head in the budget, and in addition the Director-General is authorized to seek funds from outside. It is expected that there will be large sums available for this purpose in the United States.

The other major innovation of the Conference was one to help stabilization. The program was divided into two parts—basic and annual. The basic program, a general one intended to apply until further notice, lays down in some detail the scope of UNESCO's work in each of its major fields of action—education, natural science, social science, cultural activities, mass communications and relief assistance—the nature of its activities and the general methods for executing them. The annual program enumerates the particular resolutions by means of which the basic program is translated into action in a given year.

The adoption of the basic program has made it quite clear that UNESCO, instead of embarking on large undertakings of its own, must devote itself primarily to long-term projects or those contributing only indirectly to political peace, and must work mainly as a stimulating and guiding body, devoted largely to the exchange of information, men and ideas and to coördination. The dispute over how UNESCO shall promote peace thus seems to have been settled: it must do so by indirect methods, at least until such time as a later General Conference changes its basic program.

The annual program for 1951 continues a number of particular projects which are now a proved success, and a number of others which show signs of meeting real needs in a satisfactory way. For example, a revolving fund of dollars has been set up to facilitate the purchase by soft-currency countries of books and scientific apparatus in hard-currency countries. A draft agreement has been written, but not yet ratified, to reduce tariffs and other export and import restrictions on educational, scientific and cultural materials. UNESCO is coördinating international scholarships and fellowships. It has established field-science coöperation offices in regions where the natural sciences are relatively underdeveloped. These offices advise scientists and scientific institutions in these regions and serve as a link among them. Similar plans are under way for the social sciences, and we may expect that the humanities and the arts will eventually be included also.

There is sometimes a danger that zeal for raising the level of the less fortunate and less developed regions and peoples may lead to a neglect of the highest and most vigorous manifestations of scientific and cultural activity, though these are the necessary spearheads of progress. UNESCO has not fallen into this error. It has, for instance, helped to make international scientific meetings and symposia more fruitful by paying traveling expenses or by assisting in publication; it has aided the great international professional bodies, such as the International Council of Scientific Unions, and has helped other branches of learning, such as philosophy and the humanities, to set up corresponding organizations.

From the beginning, UNESCO has thrown itself wholeheartedly into the campaign for fundamental education, for obtaining access for everybody to a basic minimum of knowledge and training; its services as a clearing-house for ideas and a sponsor of new types of project in this field are now well recognized. More recently it has begun sending educational missions on demand, to advise countries on different aspects of their educational system: the one to Afghanistan, for example, was notably successful.

But it has not neglected the upper levels. It has served successfully as a clearing-house for the most modern ideas on the teaching of art and science; it has organized international seminars to study and work out, in an in-

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tensive course of several weeks, methods for handling some particular problem, such as the United Nations and international understanding; and it has stimulated the formation of a world organization of universities which is beginning to be of real use.

Among the other threads of the fabric which UNESCO is weaving are: studies of tension caused by over-population; a pilot project concerned with traveling libraries in India; a guide to the libraries of the Middle East; the continued publication of *Museum*, an international journal dealing with museum problems and techniques; the setting up of an International Council for the Arid Zone, to act as a clearing-house and advisory body for dealing with the problems of deserts; the development of a uniform system of Braille for the blind; the completion of the world survey of technical facilities in press, film and radio which has already proved of great value, especially in showing the alarming degree to which most underdeveloped countries are behind advanced ones in vital equipment; the production of catalogues of films on special subjects such as art and children's welfare; action as a clearing-house and advisory body on the preservation of historical monuments, etc., and their accessibility to the public; the improvement of geography and history textbooks, from the point of view of preventing international misunderstanding; the field study of race relations in a Latin American country; the creation of a new professional body, the International Union for the Preservation of Nature, to deal on UNESCO's behalf with all the technical aspects of this important subject.

Torres-Bodet has always wanted more stress laid on the question of Human Rights; and this year special attention is to be given to the best methods of treating the subject in the schools of different countries.

One project which has been under review (and often under fire) for the past three years has at last moved on into the stage of execution—the Scientific and Cultural History of Mankind. All responsibility for this is to be given to a commission, appointed by the Director-General in agreement with the two great professional bodies concerned—the International Council of Scientific Unions and the International Council of Philosophy and Humanistic Studies. If this important project is realized, it should provide a solid foundation of facts and ideas for the philosophy which, at least implicitly, must underlie all of UNESCO's actions.

UNESCO can wave no magic wands, but it has proved that it can do useful and important work, and work which no other agency could possibly undertake. At the present stage of the world's peaceful development, UNESCO and its sister specialized agencies, however cumbersome and imperfect they may sometimes be, are indispensable instruments for desirable change.

THE REALITIES OF ATOM BOMB DEFENSE

by Eugene Rabinowitch

AT PRESENT, two deterrents make the outbreak of a general war unlikely. One is the incapacity of the Soviet Union to stage an attack on the American arsenal of war production equal in effectiveness to the attack America could deliver against the Soviet war potential. This inequality restrains the Soviet leaders. The other deterrent is the incapacity of the Atlantic nations to defend Western Europe against Soviet invasion and occupation. This restrains those Americans who might feel the desire for coming to grips with the true instigator of aggression, instead of fighting his stooges. The greatest danger for us lies in the fact that the Soviet Union can overcome her inequality in atomic weapons (thus removing the present restraint upon her aggression) more quickly and more certainly than Western Europe can overcome her disparity in armed strength. . . .

We are (and for a few years at least, will stay) far ahead of the Soviet Union in the number of atomic bombs produced and in the means for their long-range delivery. There is, however, no doubt that in the protective measures taken to prevent disruption of production, and crippling of military strength in consequence of a massive atomic attack, the Soviet Union is far ahead of us. . . . It is only realistic to expect that five atomic bombs exploded over five major American metropolitan centers would produce more industrial damage than would be caused by twenty bombs dropped on Soviet cities, and would cause a more dangerous stampede out of the other big cities. Because of this unfavorable situation, even a continued leadership in the production of atomic weapons will not give America the upper hand in the atomic contest. Our only long-term chance lies in matching the Soviet capacity to absorb atomic attack without crippling damage. . . .

If our preparations to weather an atomic attack are to cause the Soviet leaders to change their estimates of what they can achieve by an atomic attack on the United States, the scope, and character of these preparations must be quite different from what they are now, and even from what they were in England in 1940-41. In this field (as in many others), we have wasted five

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precious years. . . . Unless war breaks out in the next two or three years, the Soviet leaders will not prepare atomic hit-and-miss attacks on single American cities, but will deliver simultaneous blows against a large number of our vital centers—centers whose destruction they can expect to produce a crippling effect on the American war effort. . . .

This paralyzing effect will be multiplied in a future attack by simultaneous release of several bombs over cities deemed too big to be destroyed by a single one (or by the use of H-bombs, if these should become available), and by simultaneous attacks on a selected list of harbors and industrial centers throughout the nation. The only way to weather such a multiple blow is to prepare and implement in good time a nationwide plan providing for the removal from congested centers, and scattering over the countryside, of the most crucial war production plants and administrative agencies, and for the elimination of dangerous transportation bottlenecks (such as the Chicago marshaling yards or Soo locks). The plan must also make provision for orderly evacuation and useful reëmployment of millions made homeless or jobless by the destruction of housing units or industrial and commercial establishments. Local civil-defense planning will have to be based on such a nationwide plan.

Only by such a coördinated nationwide program can we hope to maintain our production on a high level if several major industrial areas were to be suddenly wiped out and to keep open the flow of supplies to our armies and our allies overseas even if the port facilities of New York, Boston, San Francisco and San Diego were to be suddenly rendered unusable by radioactive contamination.

In the discussion of civil defense in America emphasis is laid on reducing the casualties of an atomic attack. This is natural in a humanistic civilization which considers the individual as its highest value. However, the grim reality is that in the case of a massive atomic attack the main problem will be, not how to save the greatest number of lives, but how to prevent the heartbeat of the nation from stopping. . . . Not the death of millions, but the disorganization of industry and transportation, will be the main threat to our survival. In the next war, civilian casualties will be considered in the same light as military casualties have been in past years. . . .

Nationwide planning for civil defense must begin with the listing of potential target areas for atomic attack and designation of corresponding reception and rehabilitation areas. The purpose of civil-defense activity, and consequently its organization and training, will have to be different in the two regions. In the target areas, emphasis will be on early evacuation of non-essential population, on provision of underground shelters, an effective warning system, fire proofing and fire-fighting services, radiation detection, and so forth. Whatever dispersal of industry, administration and labor is at all practicable will have to be made in these centers, selecting primarily the most sensitive and irreplaceable production plants, unique equipment and skilled labor force. It would be secrecy ill applied if the American defense planners should fail to tell areas that they are prime targets of atomic attack.

Secrecy must be lifted from information that is vital for planning civil defense—such as what an underwater blast could do to New York, Chicago or San Francisco. The depth of San Francisco Bay and the shallowness of offshore Lake Michigan may make all the difference in the danger of the two cities from this type of attack—but have the mayors of Chicago and San Francisco been warned about it? (According to newspapers, a study of the possible effects of an underwater burst in Boston Harbor is being undertaken at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.)

Starting with realistic estimates of the bomb effects on a specific target, and taking into consideration the national importance of the different industrial and other activities located in the target and the possibilities of moving or duplicating them elsewhere, decisions will have to be made whether the civil-defense authorities of a given target area should concentrate on dispersing its vital activities, or on protecting them in the present location; whether, in case of an explosion of a certain kind, the city should be given up and efforts turned to rehousing and reëmploying its survivors elsewhere, or whether the uniqueness of certain facilities, and the impossibility of relocating or duplicating them, will require all efforts to be bent toward resuming this activity in its original location. . . .

Here are two concrete examples: An atomic explosion in the air high over lower Manhattan would devastate the garment district; conceivably, the civil defense of this part of New York City will have to be geared to the evaluation and abandonment of this district in case of such an attack, and plans made for relocation of its activities elsewhere. It would be better if this relocation were carried out before the emergency; but the importance to the main war effort of the activities concentrated in this district conceivably may give it low priority in the necessarily limited national program of relocation.

An entirely different problem in the area of civil defense would be presented if there were a real chance of an underwater explosion in San Francisco Harbor. Here, the destruction of buildings will be less extensive, while their relocation—before or after the explosion—appears almost impossible. The vital importance of this harbor for the maintenance of communications with Asia and thus for the flow of supplies to American and Allied

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forces there, will require the efforts of civil defense to be directed toward keeping the port in operation by all means, despite the blast destruction of many structures and the radioactive contamination of piers and warehouses.

The cities and villages designated as reception areas will have quite different civil-defense tasks depending on their distance from the target areas and their capacities for absorbing and utilizing additional masses of people. Suburban areas of metropolitan centers will have to bear the brunt of providing emergency hospitals, fire fighters and mobile first-aid units to be sent into the target area; of temporarily feeding and housing thousands, if not millions, of refugees, and of housing permanently those whose places of work in the city have remained usable, but whose homes have been destroyed. More remote regions will have to provide housing and employment to those for whom there is no more work in the destroyed area, as well as offer permanent refuge to children, the aged, and those incapacitated by the atomic attack. This kind of civil-defense activity, directed toward the benefit of people not belonging to your own family or community, is much less likely to get organized spontaneously than is the case with activities directed toward self-protection. It will need stimulation, encouragement and planning from national or regional centers.

If the emphasis on maintenance of productivity, rather than on reduction of casualties, seems to be an inhuman approach, let us remember that the first purpose of preparations to meet at atomic attack is to make this attack less likely. If the Soviet leaders decide to resort to atomic bombardment of American cities, their main concern will not be whether they can succeed in killing one, two, or five million civilians. The question they will ask themselves—and in this they will be no different from military planners in the Pentagon—is whether such an attack can decisively disorganize American production, disrupt transportation and destroy the political and economic cohesion of the country. We want them to decide that the results will not compensate for the losses to their own industrial power and fighting ability likely to follow our retaliation. . . .

The only power in the world the Soviet leaders fear is the power of American production. The chance of crippling this production will be their greatest inducement to use atomic bombs against American cities, as soon as they have accumulated enough of them. By dimming this hope, we will do far more to save millions of American lives than by providing carloads of medical supplies and blood plasma for each city block (however necessary these precautions may be), or by teaching every high-school boy how to use a Geiger counter.

To sum up: Civil defense on a parochial basis of self-help, directed primarily to the reduction of local damage and casualties, is needed, but a much wider program is needed, too. We do not mean merely providing unifying governmental guidance and federal funds to communities, or achieving harmonious coöperation and coördination among city, state and federal authorities. A master plan, analogous to the industrial-mobilization plan for war emergency, must be prepared. Economic, military, scientific and political experts of the highest caliber must be called upon to prepare a blueprint for national survival in the case of a massive atomic attack. It must then be decided which parts of this plan require immediate action, and which can be kept as "standby" provisions, to be implemented when and if needed—the timing to depend not only on the acuteness of the world political situation, but also on reliable estimates of the Soviet atomic stockpile, and of the progress toward the production of fusion bombs. Congress must approve this blueprint for "atom-proofing" the American industrial, administrative and transportation system, and make it an integral part of the over-all armament effort. This program must be considered as no less essential than an expanding atomic-bomb arsenal, a 70-group Air Force and a 30-division Atlantic Union army; and as deserving, if it needs it (as it probably would), expenditures of the same order of magnitude. The central and local civil-defense organizations and their specific objectives will have to be shaped to fit this master plan. If, in this way, we succeed in convincing the Soviet leaders that the political, economic, and industrial life of the United States cannot be paralyzed even by a massive atomic attack, the attack may never materialize. . . .

The responsibility for preparing only for the limited kind of atomic attack which the Soviet Union should be able to deliver now, or in the next few years, could be shouldered by an American government firmly resolved to bring about a showdown—by war, if necessary—before the Soviet atomic arsenal reaches alarming proportions. However, our government certainly does not plan such a preventive action, and it is unlikely that any American government would go to war with the Soviet Union unless provoked into it by Soviet aggression against the United States or one of its allies. It is, therefore, in the power of the Soviet leaders to delay the showdown until they feel that their own atomic potential can neutralize the American atomic threat, or if this intimidation fails, can deliver a truly paralyzing attack on American production and distribution facilities. Because of this, we cannot afford to limit our defense preparations to the kind of attack we may face now or in the very near future. Rather, we must, without delay, start preparations for meeting an all-out atomic aggression which we may have to face, say, six or eight years from now.

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HAROLD L. ICKES: *More about the Dollar Case*

IN LAST WEEK'S *New Republic,* I wrote about the extraordinary attempt of the Dollar interests, of San Francisco, to get back from the government the American President Lines which had been sold to the US Shipping Board many years ago. On July 17 last, the US District Court for the District of Columbia ruled that the Dollar family had not sold their stock; they had merely pledged it. The court held, in effect, that since the debts the Dollar Line had incurred had been paid, although not by the Dollars, the latter were entitled to a return of their stock.

The result of this decision, if it is not overruled by the Supreme Court, will be to turn over to R. Stanley Dollar and his associates a company with assets in excess of $60 million. Yet the stock controlling this company Dollar intended to sell, and believed that he had sold, to the government. Just as he believed that he had sold his stock outright, so the government also believed that what it had done was to buy outright 92 percent of it.

That Dollar must have believed that he was *selling* his stock is evidenced by the fact that in his 1938 income-tax return he took a capital loss on all of it. He also referred to himself, in a letter to his New York stockbroker, as "a former owner" of this stock. However, the fact that Mr. Dollar took an income-tax loss on his stock, in addition to saying in this letter that he was "a former owner," did not bother the US Circuit Court of Appeals, although it took cognizance of "these admissions." The court was unconvinced that Dollar's intent was what he said it was. According to the court, although Dollar himself did not realize it, he was not selling his stock. He was merely pledging it, without knowing this fact, and so was entitled to its return, although the indebtedness that he had incurred had been paid, not by him, but by the American President Lines. Was ever a court more generous with the taxpayers' money?

The Department of Justice has been representing the US Maritime Commission in this case, and undoubtedly the Attorney General will apply to the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. It is certainly an extraordinary situation, that after a man has sold stock for a valuable consideration, and tells the world that he has sold it, a court should say, in a formal decision, that he has done no such thing.

Not the least noteworthy aspect of this case is the fact that while Mr. Gregory A. Harrison, an able San Francisco lawyer who is Dollar's customary counsel, was on the brief, there were associated with him lawyers who, while less eminent professionally, had important political contacts. Two of them were Michael M. Kearney and Clinton M. Hester, both of Washington. Hester is understood to be close to Anthony Buford of St. Louis, who in turn was close to the late Robert E. Hannegan, at one time chairman of the Democratic National Committee and Postmaster General, as well as to another important Missouri political figure. Even more noteworthy is the fact that Mr. Dollar had the perspicacity to retain Dan Hanlon, former law partner of Bill Boyle, who succeeded Hannegan as chairman of the Democratic National Committee.

There have been rumors, both in Washington and in San Francisco, that the government will not apply for certiorari. In such an event, Mr. Dollar will find himself the possessor of enormous wealth at the expense of the US Treasury. These rumors persist, in spite of the significant bevy of lawyers retained by Mr. Dollar. His personal appearance at an affair in Washington, on June 29 last, strengthened the reports. This was a dinner attended by a select group to consider raising campaign funds for the Democratic Party. Mr. Dollar, though a lifelong reactionary Republican, was apparently happy to be introduced by Mr. Hanlon, his escort, to some of the Democratic bigwigs present, including members of the Cabinet. He was sufficiently interested in his new-found friends to make, according to a report, a substantial personal contribution to the campaign fund being raised to elect Democrats.

A point strongly labored by the US Circuit Court of Appeals in its opinion was that the Dollar stock was sold and assigned to the US Maritime Commission, rather than to the US itself. The court thought that if the Commission tried to acquire "absolute title to this stock, it would exceed any power granted it by the Congress." It might have occurred to the court that even if the Commission exceeded its powers, that could hardly qualify as a reason to enrich the Dollars. It could be argued that, if the Commission had in fact exceeded its powers, this would be a matter strictly between the Commission and the appropriate branch of the government. Why should the Dollars be entitled to some $60 million merely because a government commission exceeded—if it did, in fact, exceed—its authority?

The Department of Justice would be in grave default if it should fail to take this case to the Supreme Court. The politicians and the go-betweens should keep their sticky hands out of an affair that does not concern them, but does concern the people. HAROLD L. ICKES

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BOOKS IN REVIEW

THE UNFINISHED TRAGEDY OF ALGER HISS

by Merle Miller

ALISTAIR COOKE has not, as several pre-publication readers have insisted, written the liberals' answer to *Seeds of Treason*. He has refrained from making a hero of either Alger Hiss or Whittaker Chambers; he has not searched for any new inside information on what are surely the most melodramatic (and still puzzling) political trials of our day.

A GENERATION ON TRIAL: U. S. A. V. ALGER HISS, by Alistair Cooke (Knopf; $3.50).

Except for an immensely helpful look at what he calls "the squalid decade before Munich," Cooke has confined himself to the already public records of the House Committee on Un-American Activities and the proceedings available to the 24 jurors, 20 of whom agreed that Hiss was guilty of perjury.

On the other hand, the author of *A Generation on Trial*, now chief correspondent for the Manchester *Guardian* in the United States, has not aimed for bloodless objectivity. There are, he writes, "certain principles, which are irrespective of the innocence or guilt of Alger Hiss, and which I consider to be fundamental to our survival as a free society." He is disturbed by what he calls "the gallivantings of a drunken press" and equally unhappy over "the interference in personal liberty of Congressional committees undoubtedly sweating in the cause of virtue." Finally, he laments the fact that the entire episode helped "to usher in a period when a high premium would be placed on the chameleon and the politically neutral slob."

The author is also a man of compassion, and he conveys the essential pathos of the two men involved, the one who until a fatal moment in August, 1948, had had such an impeccable career ("the golden boy" in Washington), the other, the fat man with the translucent eyes who confessed his sins "in the manner of one long resigned to a life of profound error and disillusion."

Thus, although most of the facts in *A Generation on Trial* have already been published in the newspapers, Cooke has brought them into magnificent focus, and the whole reads like one of the better mystery novels. But, at the end, the unanswered questions remain, as they always will, unless Alger or Priscilla Hiss some day chooses to speak —or to write a book. Meanwhile, we have only the public record on a man who, as Cooke says, "was judged in one decade for what he is said to have done in another."

A decade does seem like an eternity in the twentieth century. For example, Cooke cites Henry Julian Wadleigh, the rather colorless and broken little man who confessed that he had handed over more than four hundred secret documents to a man named David Carpenter and another he knew as Carl Carlson, who was also Whittaker Chambers. Cooke, in the precise prose which almost no American newspaperman commands, describes Wadleigh as "a man who appeared, as he took the stand, to be no more and no less sinister in 1938 than thousands of other intellectuals in Britain and America who . . . had held the Soviet Union as a shining thing at the front of their minds. This, however, was 1949."

There is an often uncomfortable familiarity in Cooke's recollection of those years leading up to the months early in '38 when Hiss allegedly gave 47 highly confidential typewritten State Department papers, plus four in his own handwriting, to a bulky conspirator he knew either as "Carl" or as George Crosley. (Incidentally, the documents themselves were not unimportant, as too many of the Hiss protagonists insisted; they unquestionably gave the Soviet government enough information to break the most secret US code.)

At the time, many of us (those of the liberal Left) were, Cooke reminds us, determined to be against both war and fascism, a clear impossibility, though to say so was ". . . to invite being called a Fascist." For a while, we even seriously endorsed the merits of something called the Ludlow Referendum, which was based on the preposterous notion that the electorate should vote on whether or not to get into a war. To our credit, we recognized that what had been allowed to happen in Spain was a sorry mistake for which, later, millions of us would pay a heavy price. We had been embittered by a depression that never really ended; we had been horrified by the revelation of the bloody methods used to break industrial strikes; we had (with the help of Alger Hiss, then one of Senator Nye's most promising young assistants) been revolted by the cynical story of the international arms agreements, and we were convinced that only the Soviet Union was interested in opposing the Fascists. Thus, Wadleigh betrayed his trust and made what he considered the "voluntary subscription of an American fellow-traveler to the fight against Fascism." So did a lot of others, in lesser, more straightforward ways. It is not inconceivable that Hiss did, too.

As an outsider with no immediate political stake in the outcome, Cooke is able to point out what most American partisans have either been unwilling or unable to say. In the first place, Hiss was never (as both sides insisted) a very important figure in the New Deal; he was not a policy maker or, in fact, "ever much more than a devoted and able State Department officer just below the first rank." What's more, although Cooke does not defend the methods of the Un-American Activities Committee and suggests ways of improving them, he does remind those of us who ignored it that, after Hiss's first appearance before that group, most of the members, even such a careless name-caller as (then) Representative Karl Mundt, were inclined toward the Hiss version of what had happened. Mundt, among others, later reluctantly decided that he had been taken in by Hiss's bland manner.

In addition, Cooke sorrowfully concludes that the crime of presuming guilt

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before innocence can be laid more to the press than the committee, particularly the headline-writers "whose slap-happy immunity is something that can be cured not by lamentation but by law."

There were many who, during both trials, insisted that the Administration was ghoulishly prosecuting Alger Hiss in a mad orgy of Red-baiting; Cooke shows that until the appearance of those damning papers and micro-films supposedly dug up from a dumb-waiter in Brooklyn, the government was understandably reluctant to bring him to trial.

After finishing the tightly-written 341 pages of *A Generation on Trial*, those who want to make of Hiss a modern Dreyfus will, I think, be inclined to hesitate. However, Cooke does not render a verdict; he leaves that up to the reader, who has all of the raw material that was available to the two juries.

At the end of his narrative, Cooke does consider ten possibilities, the most logical of which seems to me to be that Hiss in the 1930s was a Communist or fellow traveler; that, like Wadleigh, he considered his loyalty to the anti-Fascist cause more important than his oath of office; that he is no longer affiliated with Communism but nevertheless "sees no fundamental betrayal of himself or his ideals in denying an association and a deed that to admit to, in the political climate of our day, would have ruined the fine career he . . . made."

No matter what happens in the future, Alger Hiss's career is ended, and there were so many moments when (this observer felt) he could have spoken out; whatever he lost, he would have gained the respect of thousands who wanted to believe that, however grave his mistakes in the past, he was a man of character.

As for now, giving him the benefit of all possible doubts, but assuming (as I believe is undeniable) that he has not yet told everything, he has contributed, along with Whittaker Chambers, to the uncontrollable and menacing hysteria in this country. And, as Cooke concludes, "If he was guilty . . . then what he owed to the United States and the people who had stood behind him was a dreadful debt of honor."

Merle Miller is the author of That Winter *and* The Sure Thing.

ETHICS OF COMPROMISE

THE DILEMMA OF THE IDEALIST, by David Bryn-Jones (Macmillan; $3).

IT HAS BEEN the theme of many moralists that one who lives his life in the light of the ideal is caught in a dilemma. David Bryn-Jones states this dilemma effectively within the framework of his general outlook. His most recent book argues that in dealing with the affairs of the world one has to become either an uncompromising idealist, true to his ideals but increasingly ineffective in the concrete policy-making affairs of the world; or a compromising, practical idealist, effective in practical affairs but increasingly endangering his allegiance to ideals. This predicament could be illustrated in practically any field of human activity; Bryn-Jones discusses it primarily in connection with the international issues of war and peace.

The author's suggestion is that on these issues one should be a practical idealist. Detours are necessary: in our world "broad highways are not always available." A pacifist, for example, may be uncompromising in his renunciation of war, but a national policy cannot be based on such an attitude. Nations do not live and function on the pacifist's ideal plane; they assume "a world in which violence and war are grim possibilities." "Individuals may be martyrs for an ideal," writes Bryn-Jones, but "the concept of a martyr nation is almost a contradiction in terms."

Though Bryn-Jones argues thus for the necessity of compromise, he shows the great value to society of the idealist. It is true that the pacifist is not fitted to shape political policy, yet by remaining aloof from the expediencies and necessary compromises he can contribute his share to the life of society. He serves as "a kind of sensitive nerve for the moral organism, or as the more responsive and tender conscience of his community." He is in a position to resent more fiercely the repudiation of moral ideals to which all governments and nations must resort. The uncompromising idealist can thus preserve society from the decay that threatens it through expediency.

Compromise is necessary, but it is dangerous. And Bryn-Jones effectively indicates some of these dangers in detail. Compromise may lead one to the way of mere expediency, to the discarding of ideals completely, to the spirit of cynicism. What shall we do then? The author suggests a type of Christian existentialist approach to our difficulty. As we are all involved in evil, "penitence is the only tribute which a man, or a nation, can pay to the ideal." The sense of sin is, thus, of vital importance to moral health. Because of it an individual will not suffer any illusion about his own or his nation's imperfections, he will not see the world as made up merely of right and wrong; but rather he will be aware of the "admixture of principle and interest, of ethical purpose and of non-ethical advantage, that goes to the making of policy in every nation, including his own."

Bryn-Jones raises issues of great moral importance and provides enlightening illustrations from the contemporary scene as well as from past history. The case he makes for the necessity of compromise, the dangers he shows involved in such an attitude, the way he analyzes the power as well as the limitations of the uncompromising idealist make the reader aware of the complexity of human decisions, especially in relation to group activities. His discussion, written in a clear, smooth and at times eloquent style, is not merely an objective analysis of man's tragic predicament, but a fruitful guide to action. Yet the analysis suffers from certain basic difficulties.

A major one, running through the whole discussion, is the fact that his method of analysis is not coherent and consistent. Some issues, especially those concerned with international relations, are studied empirically; claims are based on evidence and on relevant facts. The discussion at this level is illuminating, convincing and urbane. But other issues—those dealing with basic beliefs and values—are approached non-empirically and dogmatically. Ideals are taken as fixed absolutes. The ideal "is not our compass; it is rather the fixed star." This claim may be true; yet no evidence, no reason is given for so far-reaching an assertion. The view Bryn-Jones implicitly accepts about ideals has endured for nearly 2,000 years, but to the modern mind the traditional absolutistic theory of ideals is becoming increasingly unconvincing.

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Anyone basing his whole moral and political philosophy on absolutism has to give cogent reasons for his procedure. The author's dogmatism on ultimate issues also comes to the fore when he asserts that other cultural values are subordinate to "the true ideal of Christianity." This assertion might very well be true, but no empirical evidence is provided to make it seem other than a provincial dogmatic claim.

Failing to treat ideals empirically, he must finally determine the moral quality of actions not in terms of humanly beneficial consequences but rather in terms of allegiance to absolutes, to fixed supramundane realities. "Right is right," he asserts, "in defiance of consequences." And the uncompromising idealist who is not concerned with the human consequences of his actions is considered, in a sense, the highest type of moral individual. Yet Bryn-Jones, with his sense of international realities, rightly feels the necessity of considering the consequences of actions. Necessary actions in this sphere are seen as compromises at best, and belonging morally to a lower plane. Is this a true description of them? It is the conflict over this issue that is basic to modern thought —whether ideals should be regarded as fixed absolutes or as functional, pragmatic guides to action that promote human growth. If the latter, then ideals are modifiable in relation to specific problems, and the means employed are to be determined empirically and not dogmatically. There may be occasions when one has to resort to violence for the maintenance of peace; and though on such occasions judgment is difficult and subject to distortion, yet the mind may proceed experimentally, guided by the facts in the given human situations, without the moral reservations that Bryn-Jones introduces.

His conception of necessary compromise naturally leads to the sense of sin, which for him is the homage we must pay to our ideals. Is this final anguish necessary for the idealist? If under the factual conditions of existence—our individual and group relations—one has done his very best to bring about peace and growth, is it still imperative to carry a sense of guilt? In making the difficult decisions of life, one may have a sense of discontent, of tragedy, of profound dissatisfaction, but that one must also carry a sense of sin is both psychologically and morally uncalled for. It is true that the ideals we construct and pursue are unattainable, and that discontent is therefore an inevitable ingredient of life; but since ideals, though unattainable, are still approachable, the secret of contentment may lie in the pursuit of their infinite beckoning.

Y. H. KRIKORIAN

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THE WOODEN SOLDIERS

THE FOUR BRONTES, by Lawrence and E. M. Hanson (Oxford University Press; $6).

THE BRONTES occupy a special place in English literature. Everybody knows about their isolated family life in the bleak parsonage on the Yorkshire moors. The strangely talented group of sisters and their gifted but doomed brother have haunted the imagination of many uninterested in and even unacquainted with their works. Charlotte and Emily figure in histories of English literature more as strange people than as great writers. They were both, however, and the Hansons recognize this: *The Four Brontës* explains the family group and investigates the individual genius of each member. The authors have produced a pedestrian but solid and valuable book, a book that thoroughly digests the vast amount of material on the Brontës which has been published since Mrs. Gaskell's life of Charlotte appeared in 1857.

It is all here, meticulously documented and soberly presented. Patrick Brontë, the father, a self-made, egotistical man with an Irish Methodist background and a Cambridge education; the atmosphere of the Haworth parsonage; the early death of the two eldest girls, Maria and Elizabeth, their health destroyed by their brief stay at the impossible Clergy Daughters' School at Cowan Bridge; the fateful box of wooden soldiers brought back from Leeds in 1826 and the resultant invention by the children of the chronicles of Angria and Gondal—surely the strangest apprenticeship that genius ever served; Charlotte's experiences at Roe Head school and their effect on her character and ideas; the growing self-sufficiency of Emily and the gentle Anne's surrender to the morbid Wesleyanism of her aunt; the gradual degeneration of the brilliant Branwell, who tends, indeed, to dominate the story as the Hansons tell it, and perhaps rightly so, for there is a terrible fascination about the life of this red-headed wonder and his decline into drunken self-pity and premature death; Charlotte's all-important stay in Brussels at the Pensionnat Héger and the hopeless correspondence with M. Héger that followed her return—these and the other strands in the multiple tale are woven steadily into a story that would be incredible if it were not true.

In their desire to give a full and fair report, the Hansons have avoided interpretative comment, even where it would help the reader to see the total pattern more clearly. The effect of Maria's death on the imagination of her sisters might well have been more fully investigated, for it surely explains much about Charlotte's inhibitions and the feverishly elegiac strain in Emily; and, without going as far as Mrs. Grace Elsie Harrison recently went in her attribution of all the characteristic Brontë features to their Wesleyan Methodist background, they might have given more weight to the impact of Wesleyan hagiology and martyrology on the girls' somber imaginations.

They all died young, and the successive deaths of all his children seem to have left old Patrick Brontë, who outlived them, singularly unmoved. At the beginning there were the deaths of Maria and Elizabeth; Branwell, born in 1817, died in 1848, having already outlived the brilliant promise of his youth, a tragic, self-destroyed character; Emily, born in 1818, died three months after Branwell, refusing to doctor herself or make any concessions to illness whatever until the very day of her death; Anne, born in 1820, died five months after Emily. Charlotte, thus suddenly bereaved, struggled unhappily with life for a further six years, dying in 1855, just before her thirty-ninth birthday.

Yet they had a happy childhood. Thrown together in an intense companionship, they poured out their fierce imaginations on the chronicles of Angria and Gondal, creating for themselves a little world that belonged only to them.

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No wonder that when they had to go out into the big world to seek jobs as teachers or governesses they were utterly miserable and longed continually for the reëstablishment of their lost web of childhood. Emily produced one remarkable novel and some almost equally remarkable poems; Charlotte, who lived to see herself an established novelist, wrote through periods of anguish and hopelessness; Anne, whose two novels have worn less well, also sought relief in fiction. All three sisters had nothing to work with but their own autobiographies. No other English novelists have constructed their books from such limited material.

Three of Charlotte's four novels are reworkings of aspects of her own experience, and even *Shirley* is more firmly rooted in her own life than might at first be thought. *Jane Eyre* and *Villette* are equally autobiographical in essence, though the latter makes use of literal facts in her own life and the former works through an imaginative situation. Emily's *Wuthering Heights* is a sublimation of all the impulses she was unable to express in life. Anne wrote about her experiences as a governess and, in her second novel, tried to draw the moral from her brother's degeneration and unhappy end. Though they died young, all three girls had said their say fully. Emily had one novel to write, and she wrote it: everything she had emotionally and imaginatively went into that novel, and there was no more to be said. Charlotte looked into her heart and wrote, reworking what she found there in as many ways as possible; when she married Mr. Nicholls in 1854 to spend the last five years of her life in active domesticity she must have known that there were within her no more books to be written.

Never was so much wrought by so many out of so little. Those three passionate and frustrated girls, on whom life closed in to prevent the active release of their long-stored energies, substituted art for life and turned it all into fiction. It is a strange and powerful story, and it is told with thoroughness if without sparkle in this book by the Hansons. DAVID DAICHES

David Daiches, author of A Study of Literature for Readers and Critics, is professor of English and chairman of the Division of Literature at Cornell University.

THE UNENDING WAR

THE SIBERIAN INTERVENTION, by John Albert White (Princeton University Press; $6).

ALMOST thirty-three years have gone by since the first Council of People's Commissars, dizzy with victory over Kerensky, "declared war" on the Western democracies (in Bolshevik semantics, the "war-mongering, bourgeois imperialists, capitalists, and exploiters"). Western politicians and opinion-makers reciprocated by "declaring war" on the Bolsheviks (in liberal-democratic semantics, "ravening beasts of prey, a large part of them actual criminals, all of them mad"—the New York *Times*, November 1, 1918). This sacred crusade—of East and West, of class and creed, of "our" way and "their" way—has gone on ever since. Fear, hatred and guilt have been repeatedly stimulated and reactivated on each side by the other's utterances and acts, inspired in turn by guilt, hatred and fear.

It is a remarkable tribute to the toughness and resiliency of man and his cultures that this prolonged orgy of violence has not quite resulted, as yet, in the utter disintegration of civilized living among the contestants. The slogans of both sides recall the motto of the Scotch Presbyterians fighting Cromwell's Puritans in 1644: "Jesus and No Quarter!" Yet life goes on, somehow, among the increasingly aberrated survivors.

What is even more remarkable is that during this whole epoch of conflict American and Russian armed forces have fought one another in open combat in only one campaign. Red Muscovy and/or its converts and satellites have unleashed armed attacks galore against the "class enemy," from Finland to Korea. The American democracy and/or its allies, friends and pensioners have done likewise, from Denikin and Pilsudski to Chiang and Bao Dai. But American and Russian troops, during all these years of strife, have exchanged fire on only one occasion.

In this, his first book, John Albert White, who teaches at the University of Hawaii, has undertaken, with the aid of the Rockefeller Foundation and the Hoover War Library, to present a closely documented account of one aspect of that occasion: the US intervention in Siberia, August 16, 1918-April 1, 1920, along with its background, its context, its confusions and its consequences. The actual "shooting war" between Americans and Russians during this period took place not in Siberia but south of Archangel, whence a small US expeditionary force "invaded" Red Russia in company with British and French troops, all acting for an anti-Soviet coalition of united nations. The "invaders," sent only to "help" the cause of "freedom," were defeated and forced to withdraw. In Siberia—thanks to the policy of General William S. Graves, the disunity prevailing among the interventionists, and the stupidity and savagery of the anti-Communists—there was no fighting between American troops and the Red Army. Graves's men tried to limit their activity to keeping open the supply line to Kolchak's ill-fated White Army.

The whole episode is amazingly "contemporary," despite the fact that White makes no effort to give it that twist. (His book, though published early this year, apparently went to press in De-

Provocative comments from a mixed press on—

THE Social Costs of Private Enterprise

By William Kapp

Saturday Review of Literature: "Mr. Kapp's challenging thesis cuts right to the bone on numerous contemporary problems . . . His new system of economic organization wouldn't be Socialism, but under its dispensation businessmen and accountants would have every cause to be worried. An important and provocative book."

NAM News: "Purely and simply a plea for socializing American business and American individuals."$4.50

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cember, 1948.) His pages are not inspired, either in style or interpretation, but as historian he displays competence, thoroughness and good judgment in handling his rich sources. The facts are abundant; the narrative is readable and even fascinating, since the story he has to tell is fantastic. This volume comes close to being the definitive work in its field, one that will seem narrow only to those unaware of the implications.

To summarize the political, social and military complexities which are here ably analyzed and shrewdly evaluated is quite impossible. To "point morals" is hazardous. Yet I cannot forbear quoting a few items of current import:

"In backward countries [wrote Lenin in 1920], *it is especially important* to support peasant movements against the landowners and all feudal survivals." (P. 375.)

The Koreans in particular were strong supporters of the [Red Partisan] movement. They fought in close coöperation with the Russian forces. . . . Some of the [American and Japanese] soldiers showed noticeable sympathy for the Bolshevik cause. . . . Revolutionary uprisings occurred in Korea in March, 1919. . . . The circumstances which produced the various forms of revolt were very similar. (P. 284.)

Col. John Ward made a comment which in our own times appears to be sheer prophecy: "The Allies had better be cautious how they proceed in the diagnosis and dismemberment of this great people or they may find themselves on the operating table with this giant holding the knife." . . . The well-developed organization and discipline of the Bolshevik Party was a force which stood in contrast to the universal confusion, uncertainty, and disintegration which accompanied the dissolution of the old political order. . . . The foreign interventionary powers lacked both agreement among themselves with respect to their objectives in the struggle they proposed to carry on and support at home for their Russian policy. . . . It was a millstone around the neck of an Administration which had to sacrifice the intervention for other considerations. . . . The [Bolshevik] program in Asia was twofold: opposition to imperialism as practiced by the Western Powers and Japan, and opposition to the landlords of Asia who, the Communists asserted, retained their hold on the peasantry only with the assistance of international capitalism. . . . (Pp. 415-18.)

All of this is a generation old. Russian political neurotics, obviously, play better chess than American political neurotics. We did not know the game or the score thirty years ago. We are no better off now. Perhaps our best hope for victory and survival would be to cure our own neuroses, lest our love for them destroy us. This may prove possible, but the road is rough and the journey long. FREDERICK L. SCHUMAN

Frederick L. Schuman, author of International Politics *and* Soviet Politics at Home and Abroad, *is a professor of Political Science at Williams College. He also lectures at the Canadian Institute of Public Affairs and at the National War College.*

FORECAST FOR NOVEMBER

THE MIDTERM BATTLE, by Louis H. Bean. With a Preface by Drew Pearson (Cantillon Books; $2.50 cloth; $1 paper).

DURING MANY YEARS of political activity this reviewer has talked to countless candidates. With only the fewest exceptions they have always been convinced of victory, and they could easily justify their confidence by adding up the favorable factors, including their personal appeal, the vulnerable records of their opponents, their own impressive endorsements, and the "incontrovertible" voting figures of counties, wards and precincts. It is only natural that, working on the local level, they often fail to see the forest for the trees.

Louis Bean has devised a system of statistical analysis that offers a realistic picture of the political forest, and in *The Midterm Battle* this system is brilliantly applied to the 1950 Congressional elections. In view of the general accuracy of his 1948 predictions, made in *How to Predict Elections*, his new pamphlet-book deserves the closest attention.

But, as Bean is the first to point out, his system runs the counter-danger of missing the trees for the forest. He gives no consideration to primary elections, to the particular merits of individual candidates (whose names rarely even appear in *The Midterm Battle*), to local issues, to the effectiveness of local political parties and the other organizations supporting or opposing the candidates. These factors, he confesses frankly, "can swing the few clinching marginal votes." But he insists that national elections follow a general pattern that can be accurately perceived on the basis of an analysis of historical voting trends and national economic circumstances.

In the early spring of 1946 Bean told Speaker Sam Rayburn that, come the following January, he would no longer be the presiding officer of the Lower House. He does not make this same prediction now, but his analysis offers slight comfort to those liberals and labor leaders who, almost as disgusted with the 81st Congress as with the 80th, have been hoping for considerable improvement in the 82nd. Indeed, he states categorically that "a repetition of 1948 in votes and in seats won is the Democratic potential for 1950." The great warning of *The Midterm Battle* to liberals is that any general letdown in activity could so strengthen the factors favoring the Republicans that near-disaster would result. Every realistic political commentator, including Bean, would agree that the maintenance of present liberal strength in off-year elections would amount to a stunning liberal victory.

This becomes apparent in considering what Bean calls the Congressional "five percenters"—that is, those incumbents who were elected in 1948 by a margin of five percent or less of the total vote. Bean shows conclusively that, by and large, the 32 Democratic "five percenters" are in greater danger than their 40 Republican counterparts, because of the consistent falling off of the vote in the off-years. Democratic voters tend on the whole to be the working class; Republicans tend on the whole to be the middle class. And workers have shown themselves in the past to be less amenable to the party discipline which gets the voters to the polls on election day. The marginal Democrats include such stalwart liberals as Doyle of California, Mrs. Woodhouse of Connecticut, Crook, Walsh, Noland and Jacobs of Indiana, Furcolo of Massachusetts, Wier and Marshall of Minnesota, Rodino and Addonizio of New Jersey, Burke, Hays, McSweeney and Young of Ohio, Flood and Rhodes of Pennsylvania, Mitchell of Washington and Burnside of West Virginia. None of these incumbents was a member of the 80th Congress. If they can be returned this year, their chances of surviving in 1952 will be excellent, and they will begin to acquire enough seniority to place them in positions of Congressional leadership.

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Although an ardent New-and-Fair Dealer himself, Bean is remarkably successful in maintaining a complete objectivity in his analysis. He recognizes that, since the number of Democrats elected depends on the size of the vote, the factor of the generally light vote in midterm elections heavily favors the Republicans. As against this factor, however, his studies offer the hope that a Democratic tide may have begun in 1948, as a previous Democratic tide began in 1930 and a Republican tide in 1938. Furthermore, he demonstrates that, over the years, the Democratic tides have been increasingly strong and the Republican tides weaker.

The great political question of 1950 concerns what Bean terms the ten million "lost" voters, that is, the extra ten million voters who, statistically, should have voted in 1948, but failed to do so. "Whether or not these ten million voters go to the polls this November," says Bean, "will largely determine the outcome of this midterm battle."

Among other results of far greater importance, Communist aggression in Korea could well play havoc with Bean's predictions. Having completed his work before June 24, he assumes "no material change in our international relations." If what he calls "the great apathy of the two war-time elections of 1942 and 1944" is repeated this year, even his rather reserved predictions of modest Republican gains may turn out to be optimistic.

Korea notwithstanding, *The Midterm Battle* is an incisive analysis of the factors and the probabilities of the coming elections and merits careful reading both by the participants and the spectators. JAMES LOEB JR.

James Loeb Jr. is the national executive secretary of Americans for Democratic Action.

BRIEF COMMENT

The Story of Ernie Pyle, by Lee G. Miller (Viking; $3.95).

Among the correspondents of the past war, Ernie Pyle occupied a unique position. There were better writers and even better reporters (although he was a good one); but there was no one with whom both fighting men and civilians so identified themselves as they did with Pyle. When he called his first book *Here Is Your War*, its 225,000 buyers accepted the title as the literal truth. When he left Europe for home leave in 1944, GIs crowded around him in what a rival correspondent described as "an ovation such as I have never seen any other newspaperman receive from either soldiers or civilians."

Naturally he became a national figure: there were stories about him in the magazines and a largely erroneous movie was made based on his war activities and writing. In most of these he emerged as a wispy, slightly elfin little man, an ex-farm boy from Indiana, who had a deep feeling for his fellow beings, especially soldiers, and who was not ashamed to admit that he was badly frightened in action. Ernie Pyle was all those things (expect possibly elfin), but he was also a professional newspaperman who drove himself relentlessly, who could never, even before the war, settle down anywhere, who drank too much and suffered from fits of melancholia and self-pity only partially brought on by his wife's recurring psychotic breakdowns, and who wrote because he knew how to and always hoped, through his writing, to escape from his sense of futility.

Lee Miller was Pyle's close friend for twenty years; he was the Scripps-Howard editor who handled the correspondent's copy as it came in and he also acted as his unofficial agent. He has now paid Pyle the tribute of telling the whole story, drawing heavily on private letters and conversations and letting the facts speak for themselves. This is a remarkably honest and, without any special pleading or interpretation, surprisingly sympathetic portrait of a man who has become a symbol to many Americans. It is also, perhaps only incidentally, an interesting sidelight on Middle Western university life at the beginning of the jazz age, newspaper work in the twenties before the days of the Guild, and a front-line correspondent's life in a modern war. A. L. G.

The New Federalist, by Clarence K. Streit, Owen J. Roberts and John F. Schmidt (Harper; $1.50).

Clarence Streit and his colleagues offer in this slim book some cogent arguments for a federal union of the Western democracies. Taking their lead from the famous Jay, Madison and Hamilton papers, they use the signature of Publius. Streit has been pressing his views for more than a decade (his *Union Now* was a best-seller in 1939) and he has thus far succeeded in obtaining the introduction of a resolution into Congress urging the United States to call a convention to explore the principles of international federal union. The convention, which has received the support of 25 Congressmen, would, however, be a truncated one, since the new Federalists do not think it advisable, and with some reason, to invite nations inexperienced in democracy and federalism.

The argument is launched with an ingenious discussion of the problem of sovereignty. This, the authors say, rests with the people. Consequently, it cannot be surrendered by a national state participating in a federal union, since the latter would really have nothing to give up. While this may sound somewhat mystical, Streit adds realism to his discussions by pertinent references to the American example. The union is visualized as a compromise body operating in the broad realm between a loose league and a homogeneous political nationality. Within this framework, the authors discuss the functions of the proposed federal union's legislature, executive and judiciary and evaluate in brief yet well-rounded fashion such questions as currency and taxation.

Nevertheless, certain problems persist: national loyalties are so much a part of the modern political fabric that it seems questionable to expect the new loyalties demanded by the Streit scheme to be called up in our own lifetime. And when he objects to identifying the United States as a nationalism because it is in form a federal government with checks, balances and states' rights, he overlooks the very obvious historical fact that nationalism has long since swallowed federalism—despite, or perhaps because of, the Civil War.

The book demonstrates again that men of good will can build interesting utopias. There are evidently a number of persons who greatly admire this particular one: Will Clayton, Gardiner Cowles, Harold Urey, W. L. White, Karl Compton, Clare Luce and Harold Ickes are listed, among many others, as active supporters of international federalism. The testimonials of famous names, however, cannot substitute for the hard-driving reality of *Machtpolitik* over which most men of good will have stumbled. BEN B. SELIGMAN

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MOVIES: A Variety of Imports

A COMMON protective device of the human mind is to translate into poetry memories that are too painful to be endured in their naked form; it is not surprising, therefore, that the Nazi attempt to exterminate the Jews should be subject to this kind of idealization. "Distant Journey," from the Czechoslovak State Film Studios, is the first imaginative, non-documentary film of the Hitler terror that I have seen. Overall, it is not entirely successful, but at moments it is moving, frightening, macabre and penetrating to a degree matched by none of the factual pictures on the subject.

The manner of "Distant Journey" is what is loosely called symbolic (time and space are distorted for emotional emphasis, conventional logic is displaced by juxtaposed incongruities and involuntary associations that convey the spirit rather than the substance of events), but the point of view is not held consistently nor always presented with skill. Thus the real and individually important characters of the first half of the picture (a Jewish woman doctor, her Gentile husband, her family, etc.) are in the second half lost in phantasmagoria. It may be the picture's intention to show that such is the fate of rational beings in a time of irrational horror; nevertheless it is dramatically unsatisfactory to lose in midstream characters in whose personalities and fates the audience has invested a legitimate interest. A picture cannot successfully be both humanistic and abstract.

Then again, some of the episodes (a curiosity shop full of tinkling chandeliers, a typhus train with a bearded Jew as motorman, a group of children terrified by shower baths, among others) are ambiguous. It is impossible to tell (at least, I found it so) whether they are elements of a plot or flotsam in a flowing nightmare. They are striking in themselves, but since they do not seem to evolve from the freely associated relationships of a dream, we try to understand them in terms of a story and are baffled when they mean nothing in that sense.

So, all in all, "Distant Journey" is a confusing picture, but it is by no means one to be dismissed. There are moments of brilliant insight; different ones, probably, for different people.

"Secrets of Nature" is an attempt, relatively successful, to paste four shorts together and call the result a feature picture. One of the documentaries is German; the other three are Russian. They are unrelated (except as life is a relationship) and uneven in quality and general interest.

For example, the German episode displays the life cycle of a stickleback, a small, disagreeable fish of unusual tenacity. The photography and editing are as good as they could possibly be, but the stickleback lacks showmanship. On the other hand, "Stork Story" is exciting and charming. Whether or not he really has them, the stork seems to possess a variety of important virtues and he is both handsome and full of personality. It is a treat to watch the nest life of the family under observation here.

"Death in the Desert" is a masterly bit of spy work, done with hidden cameras and enlarging lenses and proving conclusively that the law of nature is eat and be eaten. The picture is brutal, both in its specific detail and in its implications; persons suffering from a horror of snakes will find it unbearable (they may close their eyes during this episode). The last (in quality) of the quartet is a zoo-conducted experiment to show that animals in captivity are not moved by hereditary animosities or predatory instincts. It struck me as unconvincing and rather cheap—little more than a stunt.

The new British import, "Madeleine," retells the celebrated case of Madeleine Smith, who was brought to trial in Glasgow for murdering her secret lover (a French rascal) but was released when the jury brought in a verdict of "not proven." This enigmatic finding, peculiar to Scottish law, may be admirably realistic but it is cinematically frustrating. The main interest of a whodunit is to find out who did.

The basic weakness of the inconclusive tale is compounded by frozen acting on the part of Ann Todd and her supporting cast. Even the trial scenes in "Madeleine" are soporific, an unusual lapse for the British film makers, who generally handle legal pomp with a dry relish. Finally, I am told by a student of famous trials that serious liberties were taken with the facts in this case. A sorry business.

During the past fortnight, Hollywood has been cut off from the rest of the country.

ROBERT HATCH

ON THE AIR

Showmen and G-men

BACK IN THE THIRTIES, a lady named Elizabeth Dilling, living in Chicago, published a book called *The Red Network*. Dies was then in Congress, but Roosevelt was still in the White House, so it was not dangerous to laugh at *Red Network*. *Red Channels* is just as funny, but no one laughs at it. It affects you —the reader-audience of radio and television—as well as me, the reviewer.

You will remember that, a couple of weeks ago and along with everyone else, I reported that Jean Muir had been fired from "The Aldrich Family." Since then, it has been discovered that the people who make Kellogg breakfast foods have failed to renew the contract of one of the air's old-timers, Ireene Wicker, known and loved by a couple of generations of small fry as "The Singing Lady." No reason was given, but Miss Wicker's name appears in *Red Channels*.

Miss Muir and Miss Wicker are well known; others have been fired and still more are on the skids—a bit player here, a "voice in the night" there, a co-star who holds his job only because his partner threatens to quit immediately if he goes.

While these things are happening, I am expected to listen to my radio, look at my television set, and report objectively what I have heard or seen. I looked on a recent Sunday night, from eight to nine, at Eddie Cantor, who was presiding over the NBC-TV première of "Comedy Hour." Now that is an

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ambitious show. The plan is to set up a rotating panel of Hollywood stars, each of whom will be brought to New York once every four weeks. I find Cantor utterly engaging. He revives scenes, songs, chatter, patter and dances from his forty years in show business; the result is light comedy at its best.

But Cantor has got himself into the *Red Channels* situation, so what am I to do; how do I react to him if I'm to remain among the patriotic? Cantor wrote two letters after Miss Muir was fired—one to *Variety*, the other to Jack Gould's Sunday radio page in the New York *Times*. In both instances, Cantor talked about old-fashioned ideas like fair play and constitutional rights, against condemnation without trial. Further, his associations are suspect. Gould, having set an outstanding example of fairness in the New York press on the entire *Red Channels* matter, would naturally be the recipient of the kind of letter Cantor wrote. But there is other evidence as well. I can prove—if the Un-American Activities Committee will subpoena a certain head waiter—that Cantor had lunch on a certain day with George Rosen, radio editor of *Variety* and the author of that paper's editorial which said some beautifully sharp things about *Red Channels'* methods. In these circumstances, I naturally view Cantor with caution.

So I wait for Monday night, turn to NBC-TV again, and look at "Your Lucky Strike Theatre." Here, I find Jane Wyatt and Lee Bowman making an excellent try at rescuing a dull script of "The Awful Truth," keeping the show from dying under the triteness of the story. But if I dare speak up on behalf of Miss Wyatt and Bowman, can I overlook other aspects of that program? Robert Montgomery is the master of ceremonies. I make no secret of the fact that Montgomery's politics are somewhat to the right of mine—as, indeed, they are of General MacArthur's. Montgomery does not hide his politics—he speaks them on a weekly program over ABC's radio network. Am I not honor-bound, then, to boycott NBC-TV's program, and damn Wyatt and Bowman too?

With the political sword hanging over me, do I dare mention any other shows this week? Each one would have to be classified as radical or reactionary. I don't want to establish such categories. I just want to review shows—not people's minds, or hearts, except in those cases where ideology or emotion is part of the entertainment. What am I to do about CBS-TV's "Studio One" and "Ford Theatre"? Must I go over their lists of casts, producers, directors, cameramen, etc., check these either against *Red Channels* or against my own private hate-list and then decide?

There are non-political things to say about "Studio One." I think that its producer, Worthington Miner, is one of the three or four best men in the business. I think, also, that he takes too much upon himself, apparently feeling that only Miner can do the best adaptations for the air—which is not true. I'd like to see him stick to his own job of producing and directing, and stay out of the writers' alley. I think that Miner's hazy production of Rita Weiman's "Mist" was a poor example of his craftsmanship, but am willing to write that off to early-season rhubarbs.

Having said this, I go back to *Red Channels* and find myself hopelessly confused. I know how scared are the networks, agencies and sponsor offices. I am warmed by Cantor, Gould and Rosen. I take comfort from the fact that one actor listed in *Channels*—"South Pacific's" Myron McCormick—had nerve enough to write a letter to the *Billboard*, in effect telling the *Channels* boys to go to hell. What I miss, however, is the reaction of the audiences. They are not speaking up; they are apparently willing to let *Channels* and its ex-G-men owners tell America whom we should hear and see on the air.

After my column on the Jean Muir case, one reader said to me: "It's nice to see you appear so calm and collected." He was sneering, but the fact is that at the time I did not merely "appear" unworried—I was. I was sure that the audiences, once apprised of the facts, would rise in wrath. They haven't. Now I am concerned. I want to continue to evaluate programs from vantage points other than hate, venom, ignorance and hysteria. I wonder whether I'll be permitted to work that way—and for how long.

SAUL CARSON

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